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The study of cognition has suggested different views of what a system needs to 
perform computations. A strong computationalist approach aims at producing and 
preserving true statements through syntactic recombinations of elements. AJternately 
a more action-oriented approach stresses the environment in which the system is 
placed and the structure that this may provide in performing computation. What is at 
issue is that the strong computationalist view depends on a particular view of symbols 
that are decontextualised and function primarily syntactically, in the service of 
pragmatic goals. It is argued that some of the lessons learned from embodied 
cognition, in the form of epistemic and strategic action, can aid the ways in which 
symbols are supposed to function in dialogue. In so doing, attention is turned away 
from the reification of speech both in the fonn of text manipulation and transcript and 
begins to look at the environment, situatedness, function and properties of speech. 
Consequently, language comes to embody some of the ways in which we manage our 
interaction with the world and other agents, making it a little more than an artefact but 
a little less than a complete and disembodied picture of rational cognition. 
' We are interested in the concept and its 
place among the concepts of experience.' 
- Wittgenstein 
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1. Introduction 
The primary aim of Cognitive Science and by extension AI has been to understand the 
ways in which human agents solve problems. From the inception of AI, the dominant 
approach has been one of computation understood as the ability of Turing (and later 
von Neumann) machines to solve cognitive problems Exemplars of the Classical 
Approach are Chomsky (1965) and Fodor (1975) where the theoretical abilities of 
Turing machines are strongly identified with the mind. From the eighties a surge of 
interest in connectionist architecture (Clark 1989, Elman 1991) has served to put 
some pressure on this approach to understanding the mind. In addition, there have 
been more action and activity inspired approaches in the shape of research based on 
biologically plausible models of insects. In the early nineties Brooks (1991a,b) 
solidified this approach with two papers detailing some reasons for approaching 
cognition from a more activity driven perspective. Critically Brooks' account assumes 
an embodied architecture situated in and responding to an environment, an approach 
that differs radically from the disembodied cognition carried out by von Neumann-
type architectures. 
These two different approaches have suggested two opposmg views about what 
constitute systems. Von Neumann style cognition simply" is internal computation. The 
Von Neumann system is predicated on distinct divides between the world and the 
internal computation of the system. The definition of 'system' is an input/output 
cognitive model where all the computation takes place internal to the system. Action 
by the system is dependent upon full derivation of that action within the system. The 
system senses, computes and is able to effect actions in the environment only as a 
product of a strict sequence. Thus, the only action that the Classical approach is 
capable of is pragmatic. Pragmatic actions are those designed to achieve a goal 
according to a plan based on the information the system has gained from the 
environment. A further corollary of the divide between sensing and acting and the 
resulting I inear sequence of cognitive stages, is the necessity for the provision of all 
information of the environment relevant to the task, before the system can act 
effectively. It is clear that von Neumann machines are only capable of pragmatic 
actions, due to the fact that all actions have to be centrally planned based on a 
representation of the task space in an abstract code. 
Away from this theoretical approach, there has been a move to see systems as part of 
wider environments that is as situated and embodied, where the environment and the , 
physical capacities of the system make crucial differences to what the system can 
achieve cognitively. (Brooks 1991, Kirsh 1991; 1995; 1999) Crucially, to Brooks in 
particular (Section 3), the systems he builds can interact with an environment without 
the need for either centralised representation or control. The key features of Brooks' 
work, are the fact that external interactions effectively help lighten cognitive load and 
that the need to respond quickly to changes in the environment (either to avoid 
damage or to capitalise on fortuitous circumstances) counts against 
"representationally heavy" implementations of cognition in that they are simply too 
slow. In addition, the Classical demand for coding of abstract task representation 
leads to an emphasis on abstract problem solving amenable to these abstract 
representations, inconsistent with the everyday demands of systems operating in a 
world, (insects, humans). 
Pursuing the active cognition line more strongly, Kirsh and Maglio (1 992b, 1994, 
1996) make a strong case for a category of action, called epistemic action, that cannot 
be accounted for by traditional models, directed not at pragmatic ends, but at 
changing the environment, and thereby lightening cognitive load (Section 4). Through 
their research on the computer game Tetns we can begin to clarify and define the 
concept of epistemic action in the Tetns task domain, as well as begin to clarify ways 
in which epistemic actions may be generalised to more interesting cases. In 
attempting to relate their work to the capacities of humans, Kirsh and Maglio show 
how human players can utilise epistemic actions in the service of higher-level 
policies. The ability of human players to use epistemic actions to control higher-level 
policies shows up important differences between the skills of Brooks mobots1 and the 
functioning of human players in the Tetns domain. Architecturally however, the 
cognitive model generated from the Tetris research shows Brooks and Kirsh and 
Maglio to have much in common. 
I Brooks mobots are mobile robots. They are designed to operate in a real and dynamic environment in 
strong contrast to Classical AI systems whose main aim is disembodied computation. 
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Pursuing interaction with the environment (and other agents) a little further, we turn 
to look at emotions, examining an empirical project (Section 5.1, Breazeal and 
Scassaletti 1998) that effectively tries to solve the problem of situated social infant 
learning (in robots) by combining emotion modules within the broad tenets of Brooks' 
architecture. Emotions here (which, it is granted, may bear only simplified and limited 
relation to human emotions) are used to prompt a naive subject interacting with the 
robot to fulfil the drives associated with learning. The architecture is important in 
showing again the lack of centrally localised and abstract representation, as well as 
the micro-time domains (approximately 500msec) in which the interactions take 
place. This example provides ways in which to begin to think about the relation of 
emotions to cognitive systems construed as the ability to solve problems. In addition, 
I show how emotions narrow the search space of a problem (Section 5.2, e.g. Evans 
20022) and regulate and coordinate interaction amongst parties (Section 5.3, Ross and 
Dumouchel, forthcoming.) 
As can be seen, the dissertation, while ultimately concerned with aspects of dialogue, 
is concerned for the first five sections in gaining a theoretical foothold on some of the 
aspects of what action can achieve in the service of cognitive and later interpersonal 
goals . This will allow an approach to language and dialogue in the latter sections 
(Section 6), showing the different views of language and their implications for 
cognition. From an embodied and situated perspective, language and symbols have 
been seen as artefacts that are part of action loops. Clark (1997; 1998) shows that 
language can aid the pursuit of cognitive goals by using some of the same strategies 
that Brooks' mobots and Kirsh and Maglio's work has done. However, most of these 
observations are made with respect to texts, (books) or to signs, (like restaurant signs), 
assuming the prior appearance of word-based forms. In contrast, I start to look at 
possibly the most active use of language, dialogue, which may not depend entirely on 
the prior appearance of structured language in the fonn of either text or spoken 
symbols. 
With an emphasis on the epistemic and environmental features of language, we 
should not however go on to say that words are just sounds. My working hypothesis is 
2 See also Evans (2001), Frank (1988) , Damasio (1994) 
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that speech is not like the production of a symbol string, nor IS it the mere 
manipulation of external artefacts, (the ultimate artefact according to Clark (1997: 
Ch.IO) It is rather that language and symbols can come to be seen as not only serving 
pragmatic ends, but also epistemic ones, in action loops, concerned with coordinated 
and joint activity that serves to change our own cognitive states (Section 7), thus 
filling an explanatory gap between internal computation and how language is a part of 
the scaffolding of our environment. Language becomes an activity by which we 
manage the interactions and tasks around us. 
The paper does not claim to give an answer to what symbols are, nor specifically to 
how they aid cognition (e.g. Clark 1998), but to the question of how embodiment and 
situatedness can help symbols. I propose to look at the ways in which language can 
involve epistemic and strategic action and how this kind of action can come to shape 
and fix the context or circumstance of dialogue In so doing I operate under the 
assumption that dialogue is primary and active and argue that dialogue serves 
epistemic ends in addition to pragmatic ones. In the process, language becomes 
something at least a little more than an artefact but a little less than a complete and 
disembodied example of rational cognition. 
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2. Action, the Classical Approach and Language 
The power of the von Neumann style architecture is that it centrally represents the 
information about the problem it is trying to solve. The same ability is also its greatest 
limitation. For any problem in any task space, the system must build an explicit 
internal description of the environment (Brooks 1991 b) before any cognitive activity 
can take place. If the system has less than full Classical representational information
3 
then its decisions for actions become more or less random (Kirsh and Maglio 1994) 
Since this approach relies on a coding of the environment quite apart from the specific 
problem within a task or the potential actions to be carried out in an environment, it is 
called 'representationally heavy' . The model implies a complete and static 
representation according to the relevant abstraction of code, continuously refreshed as 
changes happen, whether the information is significant for the task at hand or not. 
Now this neerj not be a problem when the task domains are either highly abstract or 
highly circumscribed or both . However, it does become a problem for systems that are 
to be embodied and perform tasks where they have to extract information from an 
uncircumscribed task environment. In short, von Neumann type architectures are not 
good at tasks that include physical goals, due in part to the inability to extract salient 
information timeously from an environment that is not circumscribed, or that allows 
many different possible actions or tasks in the same space. 
In contrast, the way in which Brooks mobots (1991a,b) operate is that they have 
perceptual systems and activity systems wired into the same module (and wired 
between modules) . For example, a rudimentary robot, AJlen, (Brooks 1986) uses 
' sonar readings to keep away from people and other moving obstacles, while not 
colliding with static obstacles '. (Brooks 1991b:18) Thus, when an object or obstacle is 
encountered, even the very rudimentary coding of 'obstacle' is not necessary as a 
representation. Through continuous sensing of the environment, the robot will simply 
stop and by activating other modules that sense direction move away from the 
obstacle. The significance of this approach is that there is less computation going on 
than in a Classical computationalist sense, for there is no representation with which 
3 Brooks rejects representation in the fonn of 'e!l.'"}Jlicit representations of goals within the machine' 
~rooks 1991 b: 19), but does not reject the representation of aspects of the world at particular layers of 
his machines. Further representations can be introduced as 'active-constructive representations' 
(Brooks 1991b: 19, italics in original). For an example, see section 3.3 . 
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the system can begin to compute trajectories. Nonetheless, the success of such 
systems has far exceeded the performance of more fonnal systems. Brooks mobots 
use information directly gained from the embodiment of the system in order to solve 
problems like navigation. In contrast, classic von Neumann architectures are typically 
not embodied, and peripheral systems, it was thought, could be added to the basic 
computational architecture later. However, this has proved difficult as far as the 
bodies of aoents seem to have effects on the kinds of computation of which they are 
o 
capable 4 
A number of terms become important in keeping track of how the embodiment of 
systems can influence the ways in which we go about cognitive tasks. The first of 
these is scaffolding exploited through the second : action loops. The idea of scaffolding 
as an aid is not entirely new and has been well covered in Rumelhart et al. (1986:45-6) 
with the example of long-division. Rumelhart et al. use scaffolding to explain the way in 
which we manipulate symbols to perfonn calculations which could not otherwise be 
performed easily internally, or without the aid of external props. 
These dual skills of manipulating the environment and processing the environment 
we have created allow us to reduce very complex problems to a series of very 
simple ones. This ability allows us to deal with problems that are otherwise 
impossible. This is real symbol processing and, we are beginning to think, the 
primary symbol processing we are able to do. Indeed, on this view, the external 
environment becomes a key extension to our mind. (1986:46, italics in original) 
Scaffolding is the structure present in the environment that we use, through action 
loops, to solve problems. For example, when doing puzzles, we typically turn pieces 
this way and that trying to match them through physical manipulation as much as 
through internal computation: matching the right colours. In contrast, a classic system 
trying to solve such a puzzle will represent the entire problem space, do some 
computations and pattern matching exercises and then execute the plan, i.e. place the 
4 For some wonderful examples and depictions of insect worlds see von Uexlrull (1934) in Clark 
(1997:26,27). For instance, ticks hanging on trees are sensitive to butyric acid given off by passing 
horses. When a sufficient concentration of acid is sensed, they drop from the tree onto the horse. Their 
world, in some sense, consists of factors not present in OUI own, as a robots world also consists of 
factors not present in our own, due to 'their own distinctly non-human sensor suites' . (Brooks 1991a:3) 
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piece in the correct places. This is patently not we do, nor, it would appear, are we 
typically very good at this kind of computation. 
In contrast, the von Neumann style model of computation or Representational Theory 
of Mind (Fodor 1987) relies on the syntax of natural languages to account for the truth 
preserving properties of thought. (Also called The Syntactic Image, (Clark 1993) and 
with an emphasis on action, more generally the Classical Approach in this paper.) 
Syntax preserves the laws of logic and thus guaranteeing logical truth. Logical 
transformations between elements (commonly identified with words) are provided by 
syntax. The symbol system in which the syntax operates allows for 'semantic 
compositionality' (Clark 1993: 11, italics in original). The division between syntax and 
semantic compositionality allows for transportability, such that an element of thought 
in the current syntactic combination is the same element in a different combination. 
Thus, there has to be a level of translation between the sensing and the computation, 
complete with a logical/syntactic representational structure which Brooks has called a 
'representational bottleneck'. (Clark 1997:21) An emphasis on more action-oriented 
models is precisely in contrast with this level of interpretation and representationally 
heavy view of cognition. 
Symbols become prominent here in providing content to the computation. Moreover, 
syntax preserves systematicity6, or logical transformation between propositions, 
where symbols are context-free bearers of content.? The problem with this sort of 
breaking down of objects, as well as reference to the objects themselves, is that they 
S Other examples include re-arranging Scrabble tiles to prompt possible letter combinations (Maglio et. 
al. 1999) and re-arranging cards in hand to lighten computational load. Maglio et al show that physical 
manipulation aids participants in strong domains of traditional AI, ie. physical manipulation aids 
search, a trivial task for a von Neumann machine. 
6 In the classic example, 'humans who can think that Mary loves John can also think that John loves 
Mary.' (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988, in Clark 1997) 
7 Conte>..1-free bearers of content are elements of objects, or other folk-psychological solids, which do 
not (and cannot) apply to any particular context as they must exhibit the property of transportability, 
and are perfectly general and recombinable. Thus 'In such a system we will find atomic symbols and 
molecular representations.' (Clark 1993: 11, italics in original) such that a combination of A and B 
producing AB 'correspond to real physical structures in the brain'. (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988: 13) 
exhibiting syntactic and hence combinatorial properties. It is noted that there is no obvious in principle 
objection to 'the idea that a context-free content-bearer could be 'intrinsicallY' associated with action 
just as long as it's the same type of action in each context'. (Don Ross: pers;nal communication) Thi~ 
assumes that identical actions can be carried out in multiple contexts. An action-oriented approach 
denies this. The action-oriented approaches discussed here assumes that action is 'intrinsically' 
context -dependent. 
7 
have no intrinsic reference to action or the possibility of actions to be carried out with 
the object; not even for instance, whether it could be thrown or not, or other features 
which could be directly related to embodiment In addition, while it is well known 
that spoken language is more context sensitive, the analyses proposed still rely 
heavily on categories taken from representationally heavy accounts, effectively 
dismissing the effects of the environment on an analysis of language. 
It is here that the action modelled perspectives seem to provide alternatives to the 
Syntactic Image (Clark 1993) in that they demonstrate that cognition does not always 
need internal symbols (or tokens) in the form that the Syntactic Image would seem to 
require. From the point of view of an action oriented model, symbols or tokens seem 
superfluous, for we can build systems that perform tasks without the need to fully 
represent the world. As Clark (1993) and others (Kirsh 1991 , Elman 1991) show, 
finding these context unbiased atoms is not necessary for their conception of cognitive 
systems. Situated and embodied systems do not need to rely so heavily on context-
independent code in order to function 8 Some researchers have found that , while 
symbols of the type demanded by Classic AI provide a great deal of computational 
power, they are unnecessary when accounting for the sorts of well documented cases 
of action that we use to lighten cognitive load. In relation to language, symbols taken 
as words are central to an internal computationalist· approach In contrast, the 
examples of active problem-solving we have covered so far do not use words or 
symbols and while these have not been ignored, they have been displaced from the 
centre of cognition. 
We now have two approaches. The first, the Classical Approach is a syntactic engine, 
whose gains in generality and power make it difficult to act efficiently in a world. 
Problem solving in such a model relies on top-heavy environmental modelling 
requiring complete abstract task information in which the system can then search for 
possible solutions and compute trajectories. Language is implicated in such a model 
due to the fact that the representational coding systems are extracted from natural 
8 Anempts have been made to address this gap between Classical representational structures and more 
contextual models of representation, through the use of connectionist networks that can code for 
contextual elements of classes of objects through the use of prototypes. (Clark 1993 :88-91) The 
networks are not programmed, but through variations in the training data set, extract stable sets or 
clusters of co-occurring properties from many examples of say, dogs . 
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languages . Thinking, on this VIew, requIres language, without which there is no 
computation. In contrast, more action-based approaches to cognition have provided 
alternatives to this model in at least two ways. The fIrst is that common examples of 
external symbol manipulation in terms of scaffolding and action loops combined with 
the inability of human brains to search in the powerful ways Von Neumann machines 
are capable of, appears to undermine the generality of the Syntactic Image. Further, as 
we shall see, actions carried out in the environment can be directly constrained by that 
environment, effectively alleviating the need for a compl ete representation of the task 
space at hand. On an activity-driven perspective, language is typically conceived of as 
an adjunct to human computation, used more effectively by external manipulation 
than internally as the basis of cognition. Language is not seen as fundamental to 
cognition, but merely a particularly powerful artefact or instrument for cognition. 
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3. Brooks' Challenge to Disembodied Cognition. 
Rodney Brooks' approach to robotics has eschewed the traditional routes of sensory 
input, representation, problem solving and planned action in strict sequential ordering. 
His contention has been that the division of the problem into these functional domains 
is not only artificial but creates further problems (integration and interaction) that are 
more difficult to solve and, it is argued , counterproductive He has thus begun with 
what would appear to be low level intelligences, revealing how action plays a role in 
the ways that they achieve the cognitive tasks they are set, often with resources far 
below what one would expect, due to the exploitation of scaffolding and action loops. 
The two main points that are argued, are first, cognitive systems are aimed primarily 
at controlling action, and, secondly, the internal system need not have central 
representational capacity construed as a central planner. Following from these two 
points, it would seem that agents interacting with a world do not need internally 
complete syntactic and semantic systems. 
3.1 Division of Labour 
Following Brooks, Andy Clark has noted that AI research has typically been 
circumscribed into narrowly defined and highly specialised problem domains such as 
producing the past tense of English verbs (Clark 1997:58). Brooks takes this slicing up 
of cognitive space and outlines the problems and misconceptions which are attendant on 
it. Classical approaches typically focus on what Clark has called vertical micro-worlds: 
expert systems solving problems in highly specialised domains such as playing chess or 
planning a picnic (Clark 1994: 13). Brooks approach proposes a way not to generalise or 
integrate these systems, but focuses his efforts on creating autonomous agents which 
operate in an environment or horizontal micro-world. A horizontal micro-world is based 
on activity-based decompositions rather than specific task domains. The focus on 
horizontal micro-worlds replaces specialised tasks (the ability to plan a picnic, produce 
past tense verbs) with goals (navigation, soda can collecting). The significance of this is 
that the goal environment is not circumscribed in the same narrow and abstract ways a 
task environment is. A focus on the environment in which goals are pursued introduces a 
number of key terms which guide the architectures of Brooks' robots. 
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Brooks in his discussion of his mobile robots (mobots) and the rationale behind them, , 
makes use of several key terms that will be useful. These are situatedness, embodiment, 
intelligence and emergence. Situatedness is merely that a system is located in a world. 
The idea is meant to act against a tendency to abstraction (specifically task abstraction 
and abstract tasks) and rather allow the proclivities of the immediate environment to 
influence the robot directly. Embodiment is that the robot or system has its own sensor 
suites that are directly linked to the control system. Obviously the notion of embodiment 
and situatedness go hand in hand, but the distinction is important, especially later in 
trying to draw the line between sensing, reacting and planning. Intelligence is used here 
to denote something that is largely in the observer, such that the source of the 
intelligence is not exclusively the property of a ' computational engine ' (Brooks 
199Ib:3). but is linked to emergence, where intelligence is understood as the ability to 
interact directly and sensibly with a dynamic world. The importance of the concept is 
that the manifestation of action may not be linked to a computational state or discrete 
event in the system. The complex that these concepts make is the push to spread both the 
computational load and the system beyond the boundaries of the physical 
implementation of the system. 
The attraction ofRodney Brooks' approach lies partly in his physical implementation of 
mobile systems, and partly on his radical approach that dispenses with representation. I 
will cover some of his arguments against representation in the engineering methodology 
of system design. Brooks approach is not explicitly philosophical, his concern being to 
build complete systems (autonomous agents). However, while there are independent 
reasons to be wary of commitments to a strong language-based representational theory, 
we should still be wary of throwing out representation in the form of integration 
altogether (Clark 1997:32; Wheeler and Clark 1999; Wheeler 2001). 
Brooks objects violently to the maxim of early AI that 'Good representation is the key to 
AI.' (Brooks 1991 a:3) His objection rests on two bases; the first is the question of task 
decomposition and valid interfaces between sub tasks or different task specific modules; 
the second is the degree of abstraction associated with the different task decompositions. 
Brooks approach is to practise with lower level intelligences : 'Creatures' (Brooks 
1991 a:4) being able to move about in a world with pw-pose, before attempting higher-
level intelligences. 
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Given the two requirements of complete autonomous systems and real world sensmg 
and acting, there are four requirements for Brooks' creatures. 
• 
• 
A Creature must cope appropriately and in a timely fashion with changes in its 
dynamic environment 
A Creature should be robust with respect to its environment; minor changes in the 
properties of the world should not lead to total collapse of the Creature ' s 
behaviour; rather one should expect only a gradual change in the capabilities of 
the Creature as the environment changes more and more
9 
• A Creature should be able to maintain multiple goals and., depending on the 
circumstances it finds itself in, change which particular goals it is actively 
pursuing; thus it can both adapt to surroundings and capitalize on fortuitous 
circumstances. 
• A Cr~ture should do something in the world; it should have some purpose in 
being. (Brooks 1991a:4) 
As far as the building of systems is a function of decomposition into sub-systems, 
Brooks favours the approach of activity decomposition as opposed to functional 
decomposition. In functional decomposition separate modules are responsible for 
perception, cognition and action in a sequence. In contrast Brooks' commitment to 
subsumption architecture is conditioned by a choice of activity decomposition. Brooks' 
subsumption architecture is such that every system is self contained; perception and 
action are immediate within a single module 1o Thus the entire system maintains a 
purpose, whereas the sub-systems maintain an activity, e.g. sensing proximity to objects. 
Brooks' activity decompositions are meant to alleviate the system's need to abstract 
away from the task space in the form of representations . In the Classical approach, the 
pursuit of systems suited to individual and abstract tasks combined with the idea of 
good representation as the key to problem solving, lead each individual research team 
9 For an accounl of the brittleness of the visual syslem of a classic representational archilecture see 
Brooks (1991:8-9). The system was not sufficiently robust to cope with changes in lighl intensity, and 
navigated in bare rooms of sparsely distributed blocks and wedges, where edges and planes were 
specially painled. No system with a comparable archilecture has managed to operate in an environment 
more complex than this example. 
10 Subsumption archilectures are layered and inlerconnected systems of such modules. InpUl from the 
environment is outpul either lo a motor or another module. 
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to perform the abstraction of salient information specific to the task. Environmental 
features are coded in a symbol system prior to the system computation. Due to the 
disembodied nature of the system this is both necessary, and encourages abstruse task 
domains in addition to a pre-occupation with categorisation. The need for 
representational information combined with the requisite code abstraction leads to an 
emphasis on circumscribed and abstract tasks. The task of symbol abstraction and 
encoding being left to programmers, the system has no reliable way In which to 
interact with the world: either in responding to it, or in being able to use it in 
accomplishing the task it has been set. For example, an expert chess system encodes 
board positions and computes possible continuations. Humans on the other hand are 
able to use the ability to move pieces in order to test positions, as well as moving their 
own position in order to get a different perspective on the board, particularly when 
learning to play. Brooks' contention is that abstraction removes the difficult part of 
the problem, leaving the system to do what it does best, which is search. 11 Further the 
abstraction, in a language convenient to the task, begs the question of valid interfacing 
between two different systems (say visual systems and actuators) that neither use the 
same abstraction processes nor have commensurate representational data stores. It is 
in part because of those abstraction and translation processes that central 
representation is necessary to a Classical approach as well as computationally costly 
and slow. 
As Brooks is quick to point out, from his perspective, representation in the Classical 
mould, as a requirement for a system, comes under increasing pressure. Firstly 
subsumption architecture does not allow any notion of central representation. There is no 
translation of features of the world into any code whatever upon which the system is 
then able to reason. Information is transmitted according to transducer signals rather then 
symbols. Neither is there a sense in which there is a module to which all information 
present to the system is available. The importance of this consideration is that no central 
representation is necessary due to the fact that there is no need for a further stage or 
central executive module with which to make decisions. Secondly there is no 
representation in the sense that no module represents any feature of the environment to 
itself for the purposes of reasoning about it. Rather the module or layer reacts directly to 
J J The approach in general has been sustained by the continued increase in computational technology 
and hence the power of searching and data retrieval. (Brooks 1991b:6) 
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the environment: because perception and action are contained in the same hard-wired 
module. 
It has been charged that Brooks' systems might be merely reactive or instinctuaL 
Brooks (1991b:18-19) responds that mobots do carry out planning in so far as some 
layers are programmed to take on long term goals. For example in a mobot which is 
designed to collect soda cans around a laboratory ('Herbert', see Brooks 1991b), the 
successful identification of a can at some location not within the immediate vicinity, 
may lead that plan to take precedence in the arena of competing behaviours. 
Subsumption architecture allows for the fact that a long-tenn goal may be maintained 
in conjunction with lower-level tasks. Thus Brooks' idea of planning is the 
maintenance of long-term goals, not the explicit formulation of plans. A module that 
is programmed to do a lower level task may be sending signals to other layers which 
in turn supersede the signal by not reacting to it. The basis for planning thus rests on 
the fact that some modules may send signals up to ten times before they are received 
by the modules to which they are connected. There is no explicit planning as no 
internal state is maintained for longer than three seconds so that, if a can is moved, the 
robot has no memory a can was there . Thus moving a can will not destroy the mobot 
behaviour, but will destroy the plan construed as the goal of the robot's behaviour. 
The morals as I take them, (in deference to Brooks' stem anti-philosophising) are 
two-fold . The first concerns his warnings against abstraction and the second the pre-
occupation with activity . Brooks' systems do not utilise anything that could remotely 
be called a symboL All signals are numeric. These numeric signals are not numbers, 
but rather an indication of magnitude (transducers). The basis for a lack of symbol 
processing is that the system is doing the perception (and consequent salient feature 
extraction) rather than the researcher building the system (code). The approach avoids 
begging the question of the link between cognition, perception and action. The second 
moral follows from the first In so far as there is no representation and no symbols, 
'the world is its own best model' (Brooks 1991b: 15) The decomposition by activity 
places pressure on the idea both of central representation, and central controL 
Complete and explicit representation is computationally expensive and does not allow 
for quick reactions to environmental changes in the microsecond domain. Brooks' 
creatures provide instructive examples of how an autonomous agent, with an 
14 
architecture that has no representational capacities or central executive capabilities in 
the traditional sense, can, nonetheless, give rise to coherent behaviour out of 'a system 
of competing behaviours' (Brooks 1991 b:6) . 
3.2 Brooks and Classical Semantics 
To pursue the first moral, the abstraction of cognitive code, semantics will have to be 
revisited, as illustrated in the following examples. Formerly success was defined by how 
well a system could represent the world in terms of static entities and trajectories; 
encoding typically involved recourse to a ' uniform and simple semantics' (Brooks 1991) 
and search techniques which were then used in planning strategy. Classical systems 
designed to execute actions usually operate in a highly constrained and carefully built 
environment, e.g. a world made entirely of specially painted blocks with carefully 
controlled light (Brooks 1991 b). The semantics involved employed reductive techniques 
in order to render the relatively complex environment in terms of ' pertinent facts' or 
salient features. For a contrast case, let us look at the navigation system of Herbert in a 
system of blocks and the navigation of a classic robot. On the one hand, the Classic robot 
(e.g. ' Shakey', Nilsson 1984) needs continual and computationally expensive updates to 
its internal models in order to navigate. Herbert on the other hand, even in the absence of 
visual apparatus, would find the task trivial, partly because he does not need to encode 
the visual field in order to move, and partly, he is far more robust with respect to the 
environment as a result of activity decomposition, as he would be able to get around in 
the dark, even with a visual system. 
For more commonplace environments, in the order of physical objects, a Classical 
coding of a chair, for example, is defined by two characterisations, both true: 
(CAN (SIT-ON PERSON CHAIR)), (CAN (STAND-ON PERSON CHAIR)). 
(Brooks 1991:3) 
This concept however is manifestly missing large numbers of other features that we 
would also want to include in the concept of a chair. All the relevant and manifold detail 
has been reduced to a single simple definition. Now while the definition does detail how 
the object is to be used, it does not specify the way it is to be recognised . Further, the 
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recognition itself requires modelling, rather than immediate relation to the object by a 
system. The upshot of this approach is that the difficult part of the operation is being cut 
out of the picture. The abstraction has already been done by the researchers. Whereas 
'Psychophysical evidence suggests they [recognition, spatial understanding, dealing with 
sensor noise, partial models] are all intimately tied up with the representation of the 
world used by an intelligent system.' (Brooks 1991 a:3) Whatever representative 
techniques are used then have to factor in all these details. Perception, which Brooks 
relates to abstraction in the Classical approach, is not cleanly divided from reasoning in a 
real world. 
Brooks goes on to what could be seen to be a critical assumption of his work. There is no 
neat division between perception and reasoning. Perception may well not be a process of 
abstraction, but may actually use some of the detail which had been previously cut out 
from the problem-solving activity. The abstraction with which Classical AI models work 
accounts for their 'brittleness' when introduced into a real-world envirorunent The 
difficult part of the abstraction process has already been done by humans in giving the 
system the 'right' kind of data. An envirorunent in which a system should operate has 
typically been reduced to a simplified conceptual basis through task-specific abstraction. 
In the order of goals for Brooks' research, this neither allows the system to deal robustly 
with an environment, nor make use of fortuitous occurrences to lighten the task load. 
Brooks' systems employ modularised perception and action. However, there is still a 
sense in which action is a response to perception, rather than there being a possibility 
of sensing activity. The system design does not allow action to be used in the sense 
that it can be deployed to discover or re-arrange the world for cognitive purposes. 
Thus a robot may navigate reliably, but will not be able to move an obstacle. Of 
course nothing stops the addition of further modules, however I suggest that the 
arrangement or layering of modules themselves will not be sufficiently flexible to 
cope with multiple purposes in these examples of activity producing robots. 
3.3 Active Representations in Subsumption Architecture 
Before pursuing projects more closely associated with humans and considering the 
emphasis on action, arguments so far biased in favour of behaviour at what appears to 
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be the expense of representation, I turn to an example of action-oriented 
representation. Mataric's (1991) mobile rat 'Toto' (Brooks 1991b) provides an 
example of representation which builds on Brooks' activity decompositions. In the 
Classical approach the rat would have to survey its surrounds and, once a map had 
been built as a representation of the environment, it could then begin to execute 
actions within that environment. The Mataric robot on the other hand is built of three 
layers. The first is a layer attached to sonar that senses the distance from objects like 
walls and furniture. The second codes for direction against a standard (North), so that 
it can always tell in which direction it is moving and how far away it is from objects 
as it does this. The third layer uses a combination of these two types of information, 
which can be gained as the robot wanders around, to code for points in a network that 
are a combination of the two factors from the previous two layers. The robot is 
effectively able, using its sensors, to learn its way about, as it moves. The significance 
of this is that at the top layer, the map is not static, but made of pairings of lower level 
features, which not only indicate a position, but also indicate which directions are 
more easily followed, for the map was built by moving and not by looking and then 
deciding what to do. The map itself does not require further cognition, but simply is 
the cognition. 
'The map is its own user, and its knowledge is both descriptive (oflocations) and 
prescriptive (it represents the relationship between two locations as the sequence 
of movements that would carry the robot from one landmark to the other). The 
robot is thus a perfect example of the idea of action-oriented representations: 
representations that simultaneously describe aspects of the world and prescribe 
possible actions, and are poised between pure control structures and passive 
representations of external reality.' (Clark 1997:49, italics in original) 
Given a location, the rat can, by knowing where it is, connect in the shortest way 
possible, but the connection itself also tells it how to get there. Here we begin to have 
something that looks representational, except that it is not symbolic, but rather aimed 
at controlling activity, built from what are initially active sensory parameters. This is 
not to deny that there are symbols, as well as symbolic representations, but that they 
are not specifically and by definition context-independent. The symbols and 
representations as well as words that we do use, contain elements in their 
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representational structure of how we can and do use them. Further these elements, as 
actions, are primary, aimed not at changing the world, but our own cognitive states. 
This is not to deny that we have such things as maps and that we can think about them 
and within them without the aid of moving around. Rather the practices which support 
the use of maps, are based in action, both from an historical learning perspective and 
also from micro-temporal perspectives, (twisting the map this way and that, tracing 
lines with fingers.) The second point is that it is likely that the representational 
structures and capacities of our heads do not contain the map as an object in our 
heads, but contain something like a map, superposed on all sorts of other experiences 
of map-reading as well as experiences of finding our way about. We look at the map 
for particular land-marks, so that we will know where we are when we actually find 
them. 
3.4 Pursuing Human Interaction 
Much of Brooks' work has been done on robots which have tried to emulate insect level 
intelligence. Even the social situations that have been modelled have mostly been of the 
insect persuasion. However there is suggestion that in the modelling of human level 
intelligence we will have to build systems which can, amongst other things, detect faces, 
distinguish human voices, make eye contact, follow gaze, understand where people are 
pointing, interpret facial gestures and respond appropriately to eye contact. (Brooks 
1996: 1) 
Connected with this leap in a system's ability to maintain more than one (call it) global 
goal, are the questions of coherence and self-adaptation. The robot will have to judge for 
itself with respect to various sensors and to the intensity of motivation, whether it should 
re-direct it's attention or not. For example in playing with an infant robot, the robot 
cannot be either too distracted by the things going on around it, nor can it be so intent on 
the task at hand that it is not monitoring the goings on about it at all. The fmal bar seems 
to be that humans interacting with robots which displayed these behaviours would not be 
able to treat them as human, and would probably surmise that they were ill or that 
something was wrong with them, or alternately that they acted like aliens. Thus a naive 
subject may be confused by a robot that is interested in shiny spots oflight of a particular 
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source intensity, but not voices or its own hands. The challenge as Brooks sees it ' is to 
identify the appropriate signals that can be extracted from the environment in order to 
have this adaptation happen seamlessly behind the scenes. ' (Brooks 1996:3, Section 5.1) 
In response to these challenges Brooks has begun to build a humanoid robot, COG, that 
currently consists of head, torso and two anns as well as hands. The purpose behind 
building Cog is to provide it with the ability to learn rather than be programmed, and 
thus the emphasis is on building perception and activation mechanisms. The experiment 
with Cog has been not to encode specific knowledge but to try and build active ways in 
which a robot may be able to find out things about the world it is in. Thus the focus of 
the project is not on the brain, but on the so-called peripheral systems, ' perception and 
motor skills' (Brooks 1991a:2), like hands and eyes. Systems and units are built that are 
able to follow general human like strategies (e.g. Kismet, Breazeal and Scassellati 1998). 
For example·the robot is able to foveate, to localise sound and then to integrate the two 
on the assumption that noise is usually accompanied by movement. (Brooks 1996 5) 
Neural networks have been used to correlate particular aural locations with visual 
locations, such that an event which is heard is mapped onto the appropriate place to look 
for that event. The idea is not to programme the robot but to provide it with sufficient 
degrees of freedom and the ability to follow what is going on around it, so that it can 
learn, rather than be programmed. The emphasis then is not on programming but on 
strategy, and in the following case we examine some novel and active strategies used by 
human players in the game Tetris. 
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4. Kirsh and Maglio play Tetris 
I have begun by considering how machines develop rudimentary intelligence. Following 
Brooks, it has been shown that, in designing robots, it is dangerous to begin with a priori 
forms or process idealizations. To increment the capabilities of intelligent systems, it is 
argued, one must abandon distinctions between action, perception and reasoning. This is 
because, working from the bottom up, there is no easy way to ensure that posited pieces 
or interfaces will be valid (Brooks 1991 a: 1). To achieve the robust responsiveness 
needed by robots in the environment, Brooks rejects traditional views of representation 
as using the 'wrong unit of abstraction. '(Brooks 1991 a: 1). In his ' mobots' the central 
executive of serial, digital computers is replaced by a subsumption architecture. This 
allows them to function, non-serially and without explicit coding. The machines achieve 
their engineered goals by exploiting real-time dynamics arising from how what is sensed 
affects sub-agent systems that control action. Not surprisingly, these robots differ from 
symbol-manipulating machines in that, like us, they show flexibility. 
To expand on the notion of flexible action and a lack of representation we begin to look 
at the ways in which human agents make seemingly odd moves within the specific task 
domain of Tetris. Kirsh and Maglio (1994) argue that a certain class of actions, called 
epistemic actions take place, and the fact that they do, affects the ways in which we 
traditionally conceive of cognitive modelling, suggesting a cognitive model which looks 
more like Brooks' subsumption architecture. Firstly, I will clarify the new class of 
actions: what they are and how they work. Building on some of the definitions and 
clarifications gained here, I will look at some of the ways in which the principles 
associated with epistemic action (essentially non-sequential models of cognition that 
accommodate more than pragmatic goals) can be exploited in generalising across cases 
outside of what is a neatly and experimentally described task domain. 
Kirsh and Maglio's paper 'On Distinguishing Epistemic from Pragmatic Action' (Kirsh 
and Maglio 1994) is an attempt to recognise a further category of action which is not 
pragmatically motivated and also does not fall into the perceptual category. Perceptive 
actions are those actions which have been construed as the motor part of a control of 
gaze. (Kirsh and Maglio 1994:5, Kirsh and Maglio 1992b) These have been divided into 
two domains control of attention within an image and control of gaze; 'the orientation 
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and resolution of the sensor ... to create a new image .' (Kirsh and Maglio 1992b: 1)12 
Praamatic action is action which is carried out in order ' to bring one physically closer to 
o 
a aoal' distimruished from epistemic action which is 'performed to uncover information 
o 0 
that is hidden or hard to compute.' (Kirsh and Maglio 1994:2) The importance of this is 
that motor action., rather than the motor part of visual attention only, is not only seen as 
the product of cognition, but may aid or facilitate cognition. 
4.1 Playing Tetris 
To get the flavour of scaffolding, action loops and the prominence as well as priority 
of epistemic action, let us look at a detailed example from the research ofDavid Kirsh 
and Paul MagJio on the computer game Tetris. Tetris provides examples of action that 
are not the product of plans produced from complete sensory information even in a 
game as pragmatically orientated as Tetris. 13 Tetris is a game played on a computer in 
a field of thirty squares by ten . Shapes, called tetrazoids by Kirsh and Maglio, 
composed of combinations offour blocks, result in seven different ' zoids' : a square, a 
long piece composed of four squares in a row ( I ), a square composed of four blocks 
(0), aT-shaped zoid, an L shape and an S shape zoid, each of which also have reverse 
formations (mirror images) . These shapes drop from the top of the field, and can be 
moved either right or left (translated), or rotated 90 degrees in a clockwise direction. 
Thus the block has one orientation, the long piece and the S shaped pieces two, and 
the Land T shaped pieces four orientations. As they drop from the top of the screen 
these zoids are fitted together at the bottom of the screen. Using translations and 
rotations they have to be placed so as to reduce the number of free spaces between the 
blocks such that on the completion of a horizontal line of ten blocks in the field, 
(composed of different zoids fitted together) it disappears allowing the game to go on., 
leaving more space (and consequently time) in which to place the blocks. Scores are 
awarded for the number of complete rows and the game ends when no more zoids can 
enter the screen because the blocks have been poorly fitted, so filling the field and no 
further zoids can be placed. The randomly selected zoids enter the top of the screen in 
random orientation. The game also speeds up as it proceeds, giving the player less and 
12 See Maglio et al. (2000) for some applications to user interfaces. 
13 Tetris was originally created to keep cosmonauts occupied in space. It has proved highly addictive to 
many humans. 
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less time to identify a zoid, decide where to place it and then to place it (execute the 
decision). The game is an effective research domain because the criteria for what 
counts as a good placement is determinate, (least number of open blocks) and it is 
easy to judge a better or worse game, (more or less completed lines). 
Now how should a system play such a game? Kirsh and Maglio use a fully sequential 
model taken from classic AI, 'RoboTetris', as a source of contrast with human 
performance. An actual system that plays Tetris, has been implemented as a contrast to 
the human player. The model has four steps. First, an early bitmap representation is 
created. Second, the bitmap is encoded. Third placement is computed and fourth, moves 
are planned to achieve goal placement (Section 2)14 On this model no step can happen 
until the previous one has been completed without being random. Now, given the time 
sensitive nature of the game, speed would seem to depend entirely on the internal 
computational capacities of the system; the faster the internal computation, the faster 
the placement at the end of that computation. The above model generates a prediction 
in which one would expect a zoid to drop from the top of the screen and then, after a 
delay for processing, be swiftly and correctly placed in the minimum number of moves. 
However, among human players, 'This is patently not what we see in the data. Rotations 
and translations occur in abundance, almost from the moment a zoid enters the Tetris 
screen.' (Kirsh & Maglio 1994: 15) Human players'· behaviour does not fit the 
predictions offered by a sequential model (,RoboTetris'). Rather players make moves 
(perform rotations and translations) before the zoid is identified, or a candidate 
placement has been selected. 
The model based on classic AI cannot predict the above outcome and consequently 
cannot account for actions that do not seem to be planned and therefore are not 
pragmatic. A model that only takes into account pragmatic goals rests on a fairly strong 
distinction between mind, body and world. The world is apprehended by perception, 
cognition takes place and then action is undertaken in order to effect a change in the 
world. Action here can only have one function. How then do we begin to account for 
these types of actions, which Kirsh and Maglio call epistemic actions? One way to do 
so is to look for the benefits of these' superfluous' actions. For from the data, expert 
J 4 The model bears relation to Brooks ( 1991 b) model of Classical Robotics; 'the sense-model-plan-act 
framework, or SMPA for short.' (Brooks 199Ib:2, italics in original) 
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players make more rotations and translations and start making them earlier than either 
RoboTetris or novice players . It is not only that there are more actions, but also that 





Unearth new information very early in the game, 
Save mental rotation effort, 
Facilitate retrieval of zoids from memory, (Kirsh and Maglio 1994 :20) 
To take one example of the several ways in which Kirsh and Maglio make the case for 
the existence of epistemic actions'S, I will look briefly at how rotation is able to 
facilitate the disambiguation of zoids with mirror images (S and L shapes) . 
The experiment conducted used two screens in which zoids that could possibly be 
mirror images of one another were dropped from the top of the screen. The subject 
needs to identify whether they are the same zoid in different orientations, or mirror 
images of one another. They shou Id then press one button if they are mirror images of 
one another and a second if they are not. When asked to identify the zoids without the 
aid of pressing a rotate button, . identification happens in the region of 800-1200ms 
(1994 :24) With the aid of the rotate button, this natural! y can happen faster. The task 
has been simplified. A zoid that does not appear congruous through rotation cannot be 
the same zoid. The economic reasoning based on this experimentation is simple; the 
rate at which a figure can be disambiguated without the aid of action (i.e. internally, 
without pressing 'rotate') is in the range of 800 to 1200 milliseconds. The rate at 
which a figure can be rotated by physically pressing a button (even allowing time for 
the selection of the button of 200ms) and thus disambiguating it is in the order of 300 
to 500 microseconds. Generously it is twice as fast. 
15 The extensive survey and experimentation provide other possible functions for epistemic action. 
Early Rotations for Discovery (pg. 21-23) Rotating to save Effort in Mental Rotation and Mental 
Imagery (pg. 23-26), Rotating to Help Create an Orientation-Independent Representation (pg. 26-30), 
Rotating to Help Identify Zoids (pg. 30-34), Rotating to Facilitate Matching (pg. 34-35) Translation as 
an Epistemic Action (35-38). Some of the experiments suggest that epistemic action either reduces the 
need for memory of different orientations of zoids, or aids the building of such memory. See also 
'Epistemic Action increases with Skill' (Maglio and Kirsh 1996, Section 4.3) 
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Analysing the situation we see that there is a tight coupling between the cognitive 
system of humans and the screen on which the game is being played. Based on an 
experience of playing the game, certain actions are found to have benefits that are 
other than pragmatic. (Few players, even expert players, could tell you why they 
rotate so early.) The rotations carried out are not geared primarily toward placement, 
but toward changing the cognitive state of the agent, to better enable placement. The 
screen, as part of the game, is also used to play the game. So in rehabil itating the 
original sequential model, placing action in the first stages shows that the stages 
cannot be neatly separated sequentially. For the screen is being used as scaffolding in 
order to change the cognitive state of the system, through action loops, which is 
distinctly faster and more efficient than trying to do it exclusively internally, which, 
incidentally, is what novice players try to do. Here, the world features as part of the 
cognitive system, rather than being external to it. 
4.2 Epistemic Action, Scaffolding and Environment 
What makes Kirsh and Maglio's paper (1994:3) different from other accounts of 
scaffolding (Rumelhart et al. 1986) is that they are conducting research in an area which 
is not explicitly symbolic. Further it is action taking place in a very time sensitive 
context or task-space and is not related to an expert activity, where special knowledge is 
required, (although there are expert Tetris players). This is assumed to be a closer 
reflection of the every day demands which are made on human cognition: conditions that 
commonly reflect a dynamic environment and a need for time sensitive action and 
information. Secondly, due to time constraints, the scaffolding which takes place will not 
be of the type convenient to traditional AI search methods. This is because usually 
scaffolding takes place in the form of external and structured storage and manipulation 
of explicit symbols. It is scaffolding attached primarily to memory storage. (Diaries and 
wall planners are a good example of structured and external memory storage.) So in the 
Rumelhart et aJ. (1986) example of long-division, external scaffolding is a structured 
storage mechanism of simpler steps in a longer sequence aimed at solving a more 
complex problem. Epistemic action begins to describe scaffolding in ways that are 
sensitive to the internal state of the agent and the possible actions that the agent may 
carry out in order to uncover salient information. 
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The distinction between pragmatic and epistemic action can be seen as goal relevant. 
Pragmatic actions are those which are effected in order to carry out physical goals; this 
would include reaching for a pen, or switching a kettle on; thus actions which cannot be 
construed as physically or pragmatically goal relevant appear unmotivated and 
superfluous on a sequential model that tries to find the shortest possible way or least 
number of moves toward a goal. It assumes that all cognition is internal. It is this gap in 
the understanding of action that epistemic action is supposed to fill. Kirsh and Maglio's 
thesis is that epistemic actions may well overlap with pragmatic action t6 and that action 
may in some cases even precede cognition. The main point is in revealing that agents are 
not at all passive in extracting information, but that they actively extract and manipulate 
the infonnation which is most salient. Epistemic actions ' are not perfonned to advance a 
player to a better state in the external environment, but rather to advance the player to a 
better state in his or her internal, cognitive environment '. (1994 :38) In the research they 
show that there are very few unambiguously epistemic actions, but that they are logically 
distinguishable from pragmatic action and further that they only appear motivated when 
we take into account the existence of goals other than pragmatic ones. 
4.3 Epistemic Action in Skilled Tetris Players 
Now it might seem that epistemic actions are only needed when we are learning to 
perform a particular task e.g. chess. However a further claim arises from the research in 
Tetris, namely that 'Epistemic Action Increases With Skill' (Maglio and Kirsh 1996). 
Intuitively, when looking at what counts as skill in Tetris, expert players should make 
fewer mistakes and therefore should make fewer backtracking and redundant moves. 
However Kirsh and Maglio present evidence to show that while following the power law 
of practice (Newell and Rosenbloom 1981/7, in Tetns, 'Ca) Certain sorts of backtracking 
increase as skill develops; and Cb) despite this increase, Tetris skills resembles other 
skills in following the power law of practice.' (Maglio and Kirsh 1996: 1) These results 
J6 For example, Rotation that aids discovery of the orientation of a zoid may at the same time enable 
placement The fact remains that it is still faster to physically rotate zoids than to try and rotate them 
internally 
J7 'Typically, practice improves performance in accordance with a power function of practice time or 
practice trials (Newell and Rosenbloom 1981) either by decreasing the time to react to stimuli by 
taking a single action (Seibel 1963), or by decreasing the overall time it takes to perform a task that 
requires a sequence of actions (Crossman 1959).' (Maglio and Kirsh 1996:2) 
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support the claim that more, rather than less, epistemic action is involved in skilled 
behaviour Certain backtracking moves are not rrUstakes, but lead to better play 
The data presented is a longitudinal study of subjects acquiring the skills needed to play 
Tetris. Three types of data were recorded: the time taken to place a zoid from entering 
the screen, the time taken between actions and the time taken for the first action to be 
executed. 'In all three cases, our data indicate that performance speeds up according to 
the power law of practice.' (1996:2) Intuitively as players become more skilled in the 
placement of zoids one would expect the number of redundant moves to decrease. 
However, 'the number of apparently extraneous actions increases with practice.' 
(1996:2, italics in original). 
The domain of Tetris allows for neat definition of what counts as a backtracking or 
redundant move. Backtracking moves are ones which have to be undone later in order to 
place the piece. So backtracking can be defined as the number of moves taken to place a 
piece less the minimum number of moves necessary to place the piece. This definition 
and data allows two further observations. First backtracking cannot be a product of 
simple motor errors. The data suggests that extra rotations are not made randomly for 
different zoids, but are made in the case of particular zoids. The pieces rotated more 
often seem to be those that have mirror images (S and L zoids) and is supported by data 
from previous experiments (1994) as these are the most difficult to disambiguate. This 
allows a second observation. Extra rotations are made before the decision to place the 
zoid has been made. This is established due to the fact that the correct orientation 
happens earlier in a rotation cycle than the decision to place it can. The decision to place 
a zoid does not generally happen before 1130ms (1996:2) and therefore the desired 
orientation is normally passed 400-500 ms earlier (1996:2), necessitating extra rotations. 
Kirsh and Maglio's conclusion is that the combination of the fact that Tetris players 
follow a power law of practice, as well as make more backtracking moves, 'support our 
hypothesis that redundant actions are epistemic actions which both simplify perceptual 
computation and play a natural role in skilled behaviour.' (1996:3) The evidence above 
provides argument for the fact that because Tetris follows the power law of practice (like 
most other skills), and exhibits a greater reliance on epistemic action, epistemic action 
can be expected to play a greater and more general part in normal human cognition than 
was formerly expected. 
26 
4.4 Epistemic Action in Reflection 
Now it might be argued that epistemic action can only really function in a more or less 
reactive way, in an environment where the outcome for any given action is reasonably 
detenninate. Kirsh and Maglio (1992b), do however offer some suggestions as to how 
their category of epistemic action can be coupled with reflection. The suggestions are 
useful in trying to show how systems designed to cope with real-time dynamics and 
complexities, such as Brooks' robot systems, can be combined with what we know of· 
human Tetris playing strategies 'because truly reactive systems tend to be immune to 
top-down interference.' (Kirsh and Maglio 1992b: 1) 
Brooks' systems present a case that looks purely reactive. And although Brooks has 
argued against this view, his systems are composed of hardwired input-output modules 
(Brooks 1991 a). The claim that they are not purely reactive rests on the basis that' input 
to a layer may be suppressed, output inhibited or augmented.' (Kirsh and Maglio, 
1992b: 1) Essentially the output signal of a module can be ignored by other modules, or 
the input signal not taken into account in reaction. 'The processes occuning inside each 
activity layer are well insulated and modular, sealed off from the computations occuning 
in other layers.' (Kirsh and Maglio, 1992b: 1) The signals then can only have effects in 
the modules to which they are wired, and while limiting cross-talk to the periphery, does 
not allow for variable effects within the system, but only in the behaviour of the robot as 
it interacts with the world. 
Similar claims of 'information encapsulation' (Kirsh and Maglio 1992b: 1) have been 
made for skilled behaviour in humans, positing the possession of a skill as the product of 
largely automatic processes which are relatively immune, or robust with respect to 
interference. These have been explained with reference to chunking, an explanation 
which works well with a linear and pragmatically driven model. Evidence from typists, 
(Gentner 1988) supports these claims. The claim is that behaviour which is skill driven, 
is under this definition, running parallel to other systems in a largely automatic fashion 
and 'insensitive to outside infonnation' (Kirsh and Maglio, 1992b:l). Brooks' robots 
provide examples of largely automatic processes. Now it should be reasonably clear that, 
given the evidence for epistemic action in playing Tetris, we need a model which can 
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integrate the information provided by epistemic actions into skilled and practiced 
behaviour. 
Kirsh and Maglio define a skill as 'an error reducing control mechanism built on a 
statistical model of the environment. ' (Kirsh and Maglio, 1992b: 1) Thus on the basis of 
practice in an environment the agent, through building a model (unconsciously and 
implicitly or expiicitly1 8) can make (imperfect) predictions of the ' statistical structure of 
the inputs it confronts and the effects of the actions it can take. ' (Moray, 1986) 
'Central to this notion of skill is the idea that behaviour is perceptually driven -
since errors are perceptually discernable - and goal specific - since the goal of 
reducing differences is intrinsic to a skilL Thus skills do not set goals, they 
adaptively carry them out They rely on their perceptual representation of the 
current siruation and their implicit model of the domain to respond adaptively. 
Activity layers in mobots qualify as skills according to this definition.' (Kirsh and 
Maglio, 1992b:2) 
As before, Kirsh and Magiio make use of RoboTetris as a contrast case to human 
players. Despite the fact that there are 17 x 2270 possible Tetris states, RoboTetris 
'represents a board [field] situation by a vector of six features: number of holes present, 
total board height mountain height, covered holes, filled rows, and local fitness .' (Kirsh 
and Maglio, 1992b:2) These features are based both on the verbal information gained 
from expert players and data gathered from their performance. 
RoboTetris does outperform any human player, but there remam some interesting 
discrepancies. For instance RoboT etris is far more inconsistent than intermediate and 
expert players. Further the profile of highest peak to lowest valley is also unnaturally 
high. Kirsh and MagJio admit that these performance profiles may be adjusted by a 
better set of weights on the six features, but as it stands, due to RoboTetris unreliable 
behaviour, they take it 'as an indication of the limitations of a skill based approach.' 
(Kirsh and Maglio, 1992b:2) 
IS Kirsh and Maglio consider the explicitness or implicitness of the model to be an implementation 
detail , although they assume that the model is implicit. (Kirsh and Maglio, 1992:2) 
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What becomes important in trying to understand the reliability of human perfonnance is 
the report of expert players of an overall strategy in the form of a 'set of concerns' (Kirsh 
and Maglio 1992b2, italics in original) . It is not however immediately apparent what an 
expert would mean by a concern for ' flatness' (in the profile of the placed zoids in the 
screen) Nor that the relative importance of flatness is maintained throughout. For 
example, based on a current estimate of ones ability, an expert may go mountain 
building, completely disregarding the concern for flatness. '[W]e take the varying nature 
of concern with flatness to be a key empirical indicator of higher level control.' (Kirsh 
and Maglio, 1992b:2) Thus flatness which should be a perceptually discernable state of 
the game, in line with the definition of a skill, turns out not to be always perceptually 
identifiable, or reducible to perceptual properties, given that it seems to depend on the 
state of the agent. 
The variable nature of the discernability of the policies of the agent in task-space appears 
to provide some argument against a theory of skills which makes them hostage to 
automatic processes that can be explained by chunking. In coupling reflective systems to 
reactive systems it is commonly assumed that the high level planner can either suppress 
input or override the output of the reactive layers, (Kirsh and MagJio, 1992b:2) 'Little 
attention is paid to actively redirecting the sensors of the system to bias the input 
stream.' (Kirsh and Maglio, 1992b:2) The inability to bias or redirect attention appears to 
create a distinction between the skills that humans display in playing Tetris and the skills 
typists have, or that Brooks' mobots display in their robust and reactive activity in an 
environment. 
An attempt can be made to account for the disparity between stated concerns or global 
strategy and the inability to discern these in the playing field of Tetrls. The account 
would seem to need recourse to a set of high level representations reflecting 'a global 
perspective' (Kirsh and Maglio, 1992b:2) 
'Policies identify how things ought to go in the course of a game. The job of the 
planner is to monitor for significant differences between how things ought to be and 
how things are. These significant differences are concerns - high level descriptions 
of respects in which the reactive agency is falling short of implementing the 
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system's policies. Once concerns are identified they are translated into directives for 
changing the focus of attention.' (Kirsh and Maglio, 1992b: 2) 
Skills then are linked to flexibly deployable policies. These flexibly deployable policies 
do hinge on the state of the game at the moment, but must also take into account the state 
of the agent playing the game. Skills here are not automatic processes, but reflect higher 
level policies and concerns, where concerns are deviations from policy. For example, if 
the profile of the placed zoids is not sufficiently flat, then attention is redirected to solve 
this concern; seeking to place pieces in such a way as to reduce the contour. Trus 
provides at least one way in which human Tetris players are different from. Brooks' 
mobots. Brooks' robots cannot undertake actions to repair the failure of a higher level 
policy, i.e. the behaviour or purpose remains in tact, but there are no variable policies 
within the behaviour. This is in part due to the fact that because the sensors of the robots 
are fixed to detect particular things, they cannot redirect there attention according to 
different policies or sets of concerns within the performance of its purpose. Epistemic 
actions used to aid the execution of a task cannot be utilised by Brooks' mobots. Human 
agents on the other hand use actions repeatedly in the execution of tasks. The argument 
for higher level policies can in part be made by a greater reliance on epistemic action., 
and therefore skills, when related to policies, need not be always and entirely automatic. 
Epistemic actions can reflect the higher level policies and concerns ofthe agent, wruch is 
in turn a reflection of variable higher level control. 
4.5 Models and Planning 
'Epistemic actions are actions designed to change the input to an agent's information-
processing system.' (Kirsh and Maglio 1994:3 8) 
The definition of and arguments for epistemic actions have several implications, not 
least of wruch is the inability of a sequential model of cognitions to account for the 
abundance of rotations and translations in playing Tetris. A fully sequential model of 
cognition aimed entirely at pragmatic actions simply cannot account for the types of 
moves that aid cognition in Tetris, making expert players faster and therefore better. In 
order to accommodate these types of moves we have to begin to look at models wruch 
are not feed-forward only, but are capable of featuring recourse to the world through 
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action at any stage In the process The models generated by Kirsh and Maglio's 
arguments for the category of epistemic action result not in a simple input-output system, 
but a system which in a single task can make repeated calls to the world through action 
in order to augment and facilitate cognition. 
Kirsh and Maglio present a functional model (1994:42) based on Mlnsky (1986) which 
begins to look a lot like a model generated by Brooks' subsumption architecture. 
Naturally given the fact that it is not purpose-specific in the ways that Brooks' layers or 
modules are, it is potentially more general than Brooks' ' horizontal microworlds' would 
aJlow The main feature of this model is to break down the input-output model of 
sequential reasoning resulting in pragmatic action which is normally assumed to be the 
only type of action possible. Here problems neither occur nor are they solved primarily 
within the agent, but are solved by repeated actions in the world, which result not in the 
accomplishment of an immediate goal, but in the solving of epistemic problems which 
. facilitate the continuation of the task 
'[The model's] chief novelty lies in allowing individual functional units inside the agent 
to be in closed-loop interaction with the outside world.' (Kirsh and Maglio 1994:38) The 
use of functional units do not undermine Brooks' proposal, but provides a potentially 
more general case of subsumption architecture underlying his mobots. Further it exposes 
some of Brooks' assumptions. It is not necessary that the sensing and actuation be in the 
same module, although this may be better for his behaviour based mobots, but rather that 
the functional units have multiple outputs that result in non-sequential cognition, where 
non-sequential means the ability to exploit the external world through repeated actions 
loops and redirections of attention, rather than process insulated information 
automatically or entirely internally. 
One major reason for the apparent success ofKirsh and Maglio's arguments is 
'The property of T etris that makes such a strategy payoff is that the local effects of 
an action are totally detenninate . There are no hidden states, exogenous influences, 
or other agents to change the result of hitting the rotate key There is a dependable 
and simple link between motor action and the change in stimulus. Consequently, a 
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well-adapted attentional mechanism might incorporate simple calls to the world as 
part of its processing strategy.' (Kirsh and Maglio 1994:40, italics in original) 
The determinacy of the system interaction provides evidence for epistemic action even 
in the face of pragmatically oriented goals. How then do we begin to generalise the 
category of epistemic action to task spaces that do not allow for such detenninate results 
to any given action? Tetris results are characterised in part by the detenninacy of the 
results of a key-stroke. Here epistemic actions are used in the pursuit of pragmatic goals 
Now if we begin to examine task spaces where the result of actions is not detenninate 
due to the influence of extraneous factors as well as other agents, the need for more 
timeous infonnation grows. This will lead to more general applications of epistemic 
action aimed not ultimately at pragmatic goals, but at maintaining epistemic goals, where 
epistemic goals are construed as being able to gain sufficient infonnation to carry out a 
task. 
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5. Emotions in Interaction 
Thus far we have covered some of the ways in which action can be used to carry out 
cognition in the presence of insufficient information. We have also looked at some of the 
ways in which epistemic action can be used in the service of flexibly deployable policies 
in the domain of Tetris that argue for higher level control of cognitive goals. What I 
propose to do is show ways in which emotion can aid in delimiting search space. In 
doing so, I will be dealing with emotion in a rather narrow fashion, that is in so far as it 
effects the pursuit of cognitive goals. This approach leaves out, amongst other things, the 
evolution of emotion and the experiential quality of emotion. Stated positively, emotion 
will be discussed with respect to its ability to highlight salient information without the 
aid of a search algorithm or decision tree. To demonstrate some of the progress being 
made in this area in relation to active cognitive systems, I will start with a more 
empirical project in the form of Cynthia Breazeal's 'Kismet' (1998). Kismet is a robot 
that is based on Brooks' (1991a,b, Brooks et al. 1998) guidelines for architecture, but 
involves recourse to emotions, in the form of facial expressions and vocal tones, that are 
basically driven by higher level policies that can aid communication with a human 
interlocutor, even in the absence of phonemic processing. Further these can be shown to 
explain ability to scaffold cognitive and interpersonal space. Secondly I will use Dylan 
Evans 'Search Hypothesis of Emotion' (2002), to provide some general clues to the 
ways in which emotions, whatever they may be, can be construed as positively aiding 
cognition by narrowing the search space in human problem solving. Lastly I will look at 
Ross and Dumouchel's 'Emotions as Strategic Signals' (forthcoming), arguing that 
emotions rather than narrowing the search space, positively highlight significant trends 
in interaction adding to the context of the conversation, such that the participants are able 
to negotiate the limits of the goals of dialogue. 
5.1 Teaching Kismet 
One example that begins to highlight some of the complexities of interaction among 
cognitive systems is Kismet (Breazeal and Scassellati 1998). Kismet is an autonomous 
robot system designed to model the interactions of caretaker-infant dyad. Building on 
and complimentary to the system built for COG (Section 3.3), Kismet makes use of a 
schematic face that is able to respond in real-time to a naive subject in social interaction. 
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Kismet's architecture is heavily indebted to Brooks subsumption architectures. Further, 
emotions are used here to solve the problem of socially situated infant learning. 
The architecture implemented is an agent-based architecture. As we have seen each 
module is not responsible to a larger integrated/integrating module, but rather separate 
modules are responsible for well-defined tasks. The inputs and outputs are therefore 
contained within a single module and affect other modules. Thus 'the process is active 
when its activation level exceeds an activation threshold. When active, the process may 
perform some special computation, send output messages to connected processes, spread 
some of its activation energy to connected units, and/or express itself through 
behaviour.' (Breazeal and Scassellati 1998:7) 
Kismet is composed of five distinguishable subsystems: the perception system, the 
motivation system, the attention system, the behaviour system and the motor system. 
(Breazeal and Scassellati 1998 :7) Aside from the implementation details of the project, 
what is important is the way in which the emotions are used to satisfy drives within the 
Motivation System. Here emotion is used in the form of an expressive state, to constrain 
and structure behaviour in the interaction with a human subject. 
The motivation system is composed of two subsystems: drives and emotions
19 
Drives serve three purposes: 
1. They influence behaviour selection by preferentially passing activation to some 
behaviours over others. 
2. They influence the emotive state of the robot by passing activation energy to the 
emotion processes. Since the robot's ex.-pressions reflect its emotive state, the 
dr i ve s indirectly control the expressive cues the robot displays to the caretaker. 
3. Third, they provide a learning context; the robot learns skills that serve to satisfy 
its drives. (Breazeal and Scassellati 1998:8) 
Currently the robot has three basic drives: Social Drive, Stimulation Drive and Fatigue 
Drive. The drives come in three basic regimes, underwhelmed, overwhelmed and 
19 As in Breazeal and Scassellati (1998), courier type words refer to system implementations, 
rather than the general uses of the words ego 'emotion'. 
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homeostatic. So long as the system dr i ve is in the homeostatic range of the robot, the 
needs of the robot are being met. If the drives are not being met, the robot can use 
emotional cues to bring the interaction back in range. If the social drive is overwhelmed, 
the robot will begin to avoid face-to-face contact, becoming asoci al and if it is 
underwhelmed, it will become lone ly and t1)' to seek out and establish face-to-face 
contact. Similarly the stimulation drive operates between bored and confused. The 
cues offered by this drive encourage the caretaker to t1)' new and novel things when the 
robot becomes bored, or too slow down when the robot becomes confused. The 
fatigue drive does not operate in a range, but slowly moves toward exhaus ted. 
Exhaustion means that it can no longer regulate its activity with the world and goes to 
'sleep'. In the long term project this will, hopefully, be the time in which the robot is 
able to integrate and consolidate what it has learned in the interaction. When the drive 
returns to a homeostatic range, the robot 'wakes up'. 
In addition to basic drives, the robot has emotive and expressive states. 
The emotions serve two functions: 
1. They influence the emotive expression of the robot by passing activation energy 
to the face motor processes. 
2. They play an important role ill regulating face-to-face exchanges with the 
caretaker. (Breazeal and Scassellati 1998:9) 
The connection between the dri ves and the emotions is one in which the dri ves 
establish the emo t iona 1 state of the robot, which is directly shown through its facial 
expressions. The legibility of the emotional state of the robot constrains and provides 
clues about how the human caretaker should go about fulfilling the dr i ves of the 
robot. 
The robot currently has eight emotive and expressive states. These include five primary 
human analogue emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness and sadness. (Breazeal and 
Scassellati 1998: 15) In addition the robot has three states that are not typically thought of 
as emotive in the human case, but are none-the-Iess important responses to events in 
human social interaction. These are surprise, interest and excitement. These states are 
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considered important in regulating social interaction as they provide clues as to how to 
go on in the interaction. 
Emotions are typically expressed in response to the homeostatic range of the robot's 
drives. Thus when the robot is in an acceptable range, positive emotions such as 
happiness and interest are expressed. When the robot is either underwhelmed or 
overwhelmed it will display emotions with negative connotations. These are taken as a 
sign (by the caretaker) that something in the interaction needs to be changed in order to 
make the robot happy. Particular emotions give additional cues to the caretaker as to 
what to do For instance, when the robot is socially overwhelmed, it will begin to show 
signs of disgust, which, interpreted as asocial behaviour, is a cue to relax the intensity of 
the interaction. In non-social interaction, overwhelming motion may result in the robot 
showing fear, a typical response in an infant who is confused by the amount of motion 
in its environment. Note that the expressive responses are determined in relation to 
drives. For instance if the robot is tending toward the exha us t ed end of the scale of 
the fatigue scale, interaction which would normally have provoked a positive response, 
may now provoke a negative response, like di sgus t, which may in turn descend into 
anger because the caretaker is essentially not allowing the robot to go to 'sleep'. The 
caretaker in turn may interpret this as the robot 'acting "cranky" because it is "tired".' 
(Breazeal and Scassellati 1998: 16) One necessary property of the system is the ability to 
show emotion relatively quickly, for instance surprise at an event in the robot's visual 
field needs to be shown strongly and quickly. 
Some early experimental data on short interactions have yielded quite interesting results. 
For example in an interaction with a person waving, the robot initially shows interest and 
will continue to show interest within a homeostatic range. However if the waving 
becomes to strong or vigorous, the robot begins to show fear, signalling the person to 
regulate the intensity of the motion to bring the robot back into homeostatic range. Due 
to the robot's ability to distinguish between faces and non-faces, in interactions with a 
slinky, the robot does not only show fear, but eventually begins to get angry if the 
intensity of the fulfilment of the drives is too high. Alternately in interactions with faces, 
the robot will at first show disgust, becoming angrier as the interaction is continued too 
long at too high an intensity. Generally the robot is 'happier' playing with people, than 
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with its toys, as it fulfils more drives, although it is still ' interested ' in its toys. (Breazeal 
and Scassellati 1998: Figures 13-18, for graphs showing activation levels of robots 
dr i ves and emoti on s in interaction.) 
This project is one manifestation of the way in which a fast and responsive architecture 
is being used to provide an analogue to human social interaction. Again there is no need 
for representationally invested accounts of the system, as the system makes use of 
transducers, rather than code-like categorisations. Even in the absence of phonemic 
processing, the robot is able to interact legibly with a human subject. Emoti ons are 
used to fulfil d rive s of the robot, essentially maintaining a learning environment. 
Subjects in that environment are not passive parts of the environment, but are actively 
sought out in order for the robot to ultimately learn. The expressive acts of the robot aim 
at being legible to human subjects, effectively giving the human subject cues as to how 
interact with the robot. The expressive states here are not pragmatically motivated but 
are aimed at maintaining a state of affairs congenial to the robot's d r i v e s being 
fulfilled . The emotional s t a tes of the robot are not arrived at by a decision, but 
are in direct response to what is going on in the world, and more importantly what is 
going on in the interaction with either a human subject or its toys. Kismet ' s emotions 
serve to signal ways in which to interact appropriately in order to fulfil its drives which 
are instantiations of the pragmatic goal of social learning. The goal of Kismet's 
emo tions is however epistemic, aimed at maintaining a suitable level of interaction to 
facilitate the goal of the current system.20 
The drives themselves can be see as goals or policies expressed through emotional states. 
Emotional states then provide cues to the fulfilment of these goals. When the interaction 
is proceeding according to a normative policy, then the robot merely encourages the 
interaction. When the interaction begins to deviate from the fulfilment of the robots 
policies, this creates a concern which is addressed by the providing emotional and 
20 The Kismet system does not as yet learn anything. It, like Brooks' mobots, does not have a memo!),. 
The architecture differs from a classical architecture in that the interactions do not have to be 
sequential, nor do data stores describing emotions have to be programmed. The emotions expressed by 
humans and legible to the robot do not have to be categorised. The robot is able to function without any 
representational architecture as tractitionaily understood. It interacts legibly because of sophisticated 
peripheral systems. It is still an open question as to whether any learning in a system of this kind can 
tak~ place. In line with Brooks ' programme, the system begins to provide ways in which a learning 
envuonment, approaching the natural learning environment of an infant, can be maintained. 
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affective clues to the subject. This in turn creates expectations that the behaviour that 
produces such a concern will in fact be altered. As we will see these kinds of clues 
provide insights into the function of emotion in interaction. 
5.2 The Search Hypothesis of Emotion 
Turning to a view that details way in which emotions can aid problem-solving, Dylan 
Evans' 'Search Hypothesis of Emotion' (2002) is an attempt to clarify at least one 
way in which emotion can aid cognition, effectively trying to free cognition from 
mere computation in the face of a priori emotional subjective utility value. In the 
process he distinguishes between what emotions are supposed to do and what they 
are. For the purposes of this paper, what emotions are supposed to do is more 
important than what they are. According to Evans ' reading however, we do need 
some idea of what emotions are in order to evaluate his theory and so I will try to 
show what emotions might be in the context of this theory, using restricted and 
affective definitions of emotions, showing what they might be able to accomplish in 
interpersonal dialogue. 
From the perspective of rational decision making and planning, emotions have 
essentially been viewed in a negative light. Human reasoning is better as far as it is 
unaffected by the emotions. Evans calls this the 'negative view of emotions.' (2001) In 
contrast Evans, with Frank (1988) and Damasio (1994) have begun to argue for a 
positive view of emotion that affects reasoning for the better. 'The positive view 
suggests, that other things being equal, humans will be less rational to the extent that 
they lack emotion.' (Evans 2002:498, italics in original). 
As Evans explains, from Hobbes onward, emotion has been seen as the way in which the 
desires or ends of agent are fixed, quite aside from rational decision-making. Rationality 
is limited to finding the most efficient means to an end, but cannot fix ends. 'Reason is 
thus reduced to computation, in true Hobbesian fashion.' (Evans 2002:498) The 
assumption in rational choice theory has been that reason is able to fix the possible 
outcomes in any given scenario, to which the emotions can attach a utility value and 
reason can then set about calculating the most efficient path to utility satisfaction and 
maximisation. However it turns out to be a non-trivial task to be able to fix the possible 
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outcomes of a scenano. Given that the effect of a decision can have progressively 
burgeoning outcomes based on this outcome and the decision to pursue it, the task 
quickly turns into too many alternatives and possible scenarios from which to choose. 
Nor can we solve the problem by assigning a utility value for time, because this decision 
would itself require a decision leading to an infinite regress
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Due to these problems in 
what appears to be the inability to fix ends, Evans claims that 'emotions, ... , play more 
than one role in rational choice. Not only do they assign subjective utility to each 
outcome; they also delimit the range of outcomes to be considered.' (Evans 2002:500) 
Now it may seem that emotions can be the answer to the search problem, where problem 
solving is construed as the ability to search (Newell and Simon, 1976). Rather than 
generate a complete set of possibilities, we open the search space step by step, looking 
for acceptable solutions at every stage. If the solution is acceptable, the search is 
terminated. If the solution is unacceptable, the search continues to expand. What this 
means is that 'Emotions prevent us from getting lost in endless explorations of 
potentially infinite search spaces by providing us with both the right kind of test and the 
right kind of search strategy for each problem that we must solve.' (Evans 2002:503) 
The search strategy employed to make decisions is simply that I imagine, one at a time, 
the possible outcomes of a particular decision. If the outcome meets the test, which may 
be as simple 'as meeting some aspiration level.' (Evans 2002:502) or simply being too 
much bother, then the search is terminated. 
The search hypothesis of emotion is not a claim about what emotions are, but what they 
do. Further, as noted by Evans, it is vacuous claim unless we have some independent 
idea of what emotions are, against which it can be evaluated, but first, some possible 
objections. The recourse to the search problem at all seems to suggest some commitment 
to a computational theory of mind; however, as a claim about what emotions do, rather 
than what they are, it is not necessary to assume that emotions involve 'rule-governed 
transformations of syntactic representations,' (Evans 2002:507). The search hypothesis 
does not then stand or fall with computationalism or the Classical Approach. What it 
does say is that emotions can be used in ways that aid cognition and decision making, 
21 This problem has been solved through the use of stochastic cut functions in many classical expert 
systems e.g. logic theorem provers (Don Ross: personal communication). I think the problem Evans is 
trying to highlight, is that the vast range of possibilities, considered aside from emotion, may lead 
humans either to confusion, or the inability to make a decision. 
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rather than hindering it. Rather than fixing ends amongst possible options, emotions can 
cut down the search space so as to reduce computational load. When ends are not even 
considered, emotions can begin to be seen as a positive way of stating the possible 
outcomes of a search space. Evans is assuming the confrontation of agent with a task, 
rather than decision-making amongst agents. And so we begin to examine ways in which 
emotions may play a part in the interaction amongst agents which, rather than only 
narrowing the search space of a potential decision tree, is used to highlight salient points 
of interaction that will in turn create expectations of the participating agent. 
5.3 Emotions as Strategic Signals 
Ross and Dumouchel (forthcoming) take up a complementary point of view to that of 
Evans (2002), in criticising '''Hume's chasm' in contemporary accounts of emotion" 
(Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming : footnote 16); arguing that reason need not be a 
"slave of the passions". The 'negative view of emotions' (Evans 2001) has been 
undermined in recent years by Frank's (1988) book Passions within Reason
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Ross and 
Dumouchel's paper is an attempt to refine Frank' s thesis, claiming that emotions rather 
than being a disturbance to reason, are an aid in avoiding mutually uncongenial 
situations among rational agents. Here, in the context of arguments about how economic 
game theory can be applied to emotions, Ross and Dumouchel ask 'What interactive 
purposes do emotional signalling systems evolve and stabilize to serve? ' (Ross and 
Dumouchel forthcoming: 19 emphasis added.) Ross and Dumouchel argue that emotions 
are used as a tool for negotiation between agents to signal unacceptable outcomes (e.g. 
prisoners dilemmas) in a game-theoretic tree, and hence to try and avoid them. 
Ross and Dumouchel analyse ' agents using emotions to avoid getting into games that 
are dilemmas.' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming : 7) This formulation is in 
distinction to Frank's formulation of 'agents using emotions and other commitment 
devices to get out of social dilemmas' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming: 7) The 
burden of the reformulation rests on the fact that strategic signals can be used to 
encode preference intensities, which are difficult to infer, rather than preference 
22 The first statement of the thesis, 'which used a combination of evolutionary psychology and Smith's 
moral philosophy to endogenise emotional influences with the model of the rational economic agent' , 
was made by HirsWeifer (1987), although Ross and Dumouchel address their criticisms and revisions 
to Frank (1988; 2003) in particular. 
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orderings that are more easily inferred. Furthennore, unlike standard commitment 
devices, strategic signals need not be explicitly ' constructed in advance of strategic 
interaction. ' (Spurrett and Cowley forthcoming : 15) The use of emotion allows agents 
to credibly signal preference intensity. This credible signal can then in turn be used to 
(sometimes) avoid games that are mutually unbeneficial to the agents concerned, not 
by getting out of games like prisoners dilemmas, but to avoid these intractable 
situations altogether. 
Ross and Dumouchel (forthcoming) introduce the distinction between control-system 
mechanisms and conventionalised signalling systems. Ross and Dumouchel suggest 
that there is no reliable way to distinguish these through the use of a folk-
psychological term. The distinction is useful in sorting out, for the purposes of game 
theory, games and signalling happening amongst a group of people, and legible both 
to the party giving the signal, the interlocutor and other people within the group, from 
neuropsychological and bodily responses to events. Accordingly, Ross and 
Dumouchel argue that 'the culturally variable, conventional symbols by which groups 
of people sort out their behavioural patterns into emotional types are fundamentally 
strategic' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming : 10). Further, 
' Emotions in the sense of neuropsychological responses . .. are strategic 
responses only occasionally and accidentally, whereas conventionalised 
emotional signalling systems are essentially strategic systems, in the sense that 
but for this function they wouldn't exist.' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming : 11) 
Emotion, as understood in Ross and Dumouchel (forthcoming), simply is the 
conventionalised signalling that happens amongst groups of people, and does not refer 
to more automatic responses of neuropsychological states, that may be an appropriate 
agent response to an event (whether it involve other agents or not). 
Emotions understood as conventionalised signalling systems are by definition public, 
arising amongst groups of agents. This goes some way to explaining the 'enonnous 
variation on the input side, that is, with respect to their causal aetiologies as regards 
mechanisms, stimuli, and degrees of cognitive penetration of emotional responses, 
relative to the degree of output variability, that is, cross-cultural disagreement in typing 
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and understanding of emotional responses' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming : 18). This 
type of evidence is used by Ross and Dumouchel (forthcoming) to motivate the 
distinction between control-system mechanisms and conventionalised signalling 
systems, a distinction that Frank (1988) fails to make. 
Thus, guided by some of the considerations explored in Clark (1997) Ross and 
Dumouchel ' s use of the term emotion is not based in neuropsychological response, 
and therefore need not depend on physical processes confined to the biological body 
of the agent. Thus, emotion, in reference to conventional signalling derives its 
'meaning ' not from physical processes of an agents body, but is at least in part 'a 
function of wide environmental, socially governed, [and] contextual factors that are 
exploited by decoders.' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming : 14) On this 
understanding, the fact that signalling is public means that an ' individual "doing the 
meaning" relies on these socially governed factors, in just the same way as here 
interlocutors do, to understand herself. ' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming : 14) 
Emotional signalling fits well with a distributed view of cognition, that posits causally 
complex aetiologies of events, not confined to the internal physical processes of an 
agent ' s body. 
One important point is that ' According to Dumouchel (1999), emotional signalling is 
produced by systems of expression which are continuous, in which those events to 
which we give names of particular emotions are salient moments in uninterrupted 
processes of affective expression' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming: 18). For 
example, in the simpler case of Kismet, even though different affective states can be 
labelled at different times, for instance Kismet may grow angry, this does not show the 
presence of a digital system, but rather an analogue system, that is continuously active, 
but might for the purposes of signalling, be labelled by agents. 
Emotional signalling makes use of affective states to establish expectations. 'Through 
such things as bodily posture, muscle tone, pitch of voice and facial expression we 
negotiate reciprocal intentions into tolerably stable sets of expectations within which our 
base level games are well-defined' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming: 21, italics in 
original). Emotions are used as signals to establish a ground in which the relationship 
(conceived here as a game amongst agents) is to be played. The importance of these 
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emotional signals is that they do not typically function to exchange information about 
objectives or goals, but 'dynamically influence and determine each others intentions 
through exchanges of affective expression. ' (Ross and Dumouchel, forthcoming : 21 , 
italics in original.) We do not communicate about the objectives of interaction, but 
throuah the exchanae of information about preference cardinalities, communicate the v 0 
base-level meta-games in which subsequent games will be played. 
Crucially, the reason that we have to do this, is that prior to any interaction, in the form 
of negotiation, 'there is often no fact of the matter as to which game we're playing. This 
process of affective exchange usually rapidly evolves towards some (more or less) fixed 
point of coordination that ' frames ' or ' tropes ' our relationship : distaste, pleasure, love 
fear, anger, confidence, disappointment, etc. - the Smithian sentiments.' (Ross and 
Dumouchel forthcoming: 21) Rather than emotions being used to narrow a potentially 
infinite search space, amongst agents, emotion is used to negotiate and coordinate a 
space for that interaction. The negotiation sets a base-line sentiment for the relationship . 
Importantly this is not information that can be decided on prior to interaction, but is a 
result of coordination. 
Emotional signalling then is not primarily aimed at specific goals, and in the absence of 
these goals, the signals will be epistemic and strategi·c actions aimed at creating 
expectations about the goals to be pursued in this and successive interactions. 
, 'Coordination,' here should not be taken as referring only to the focal points of 
well-defined conventions in particular games . Rather, affective coordination 
underlies all types of social interactions. People not only play repeated games 
with each other, but interact with (and expect to interact with) the same 
individuals across ranges of different games over time. [ .. . ] More generally, it 
leads to the fact that in a social context what has to be taken into account is not 
only the value of the objective pursued but also the value ofthe relationship itself 
for the organisms involved' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming: 20-21). 
The creation of expectation is important in so far it serves to bring about coordination 
amongst agents, as well as to maintain it 'The important point is that public emotional-
state categorization creates expectations in others, including third-party observers of 
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negotiations, and the very existence of these emotions will then tend to constrain agents ' 
behaviour' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming: 22-23). Emotional, strategic and 
epistemic signalling, when it is converged upon by agents in interaction, is not 
concerned only with the value of a goal, but also with the value of the relationship itself 
'Our basic claim, then, is that conventions goverrling emotional expression can 
constrain interactive behaviour by creating expectations to which agents hold one 
another responsible in systems of self-enforcing equilibria They can play this role 
equally well not only at the ground level of face to face interactions, but also in 
more abstract and temporally e;....1:ended bargaining contexts where agents nev.er 
actually meet' (Ross and Dumouchel forthcoming : 24). 
Ross and Dumouchel provide ways of understanding emotion as active signalling 
amongst agents that has epistemic benefit in that it uncovers information about the 
relationships involved and in so doing changes the cognitive state of the agent, both 
by the very act of signalling and by the response of interlocutors. 
5.4 Emotions as Epistemic Action 
In any glven case, what is the goal of emotional signalling and how can it be 
compared to epistemic action? The aim of emotional signalling is coordination, where 
sentiments are coordinated to avoid games that are mutually unbeneficial to the agents 
involved . The purpose of signalling includes the value and maintenance of a 
relationship . Emotional signalling, understood as socially and publicly 
conventionalized, places constraints and creates expectations for future behaviour. In 
comparison to the examples of epistemic actions so far examined, all of which have 
been in a very short time domain, signalling systems can be applied both to longer 
term strategic negotiations as well as to short-term face-to-face encounters. They are 
like epistemic actions in that they do not need to be explicitly planned, neither need 
the agents involved fix on emotional-state labels for the purposes of signalling. 
Further they are not digital mechanisms that can be switched on and off, but 
continuously present in interaction. Emotional signalling is particularly interesting in 
that it does not primarily concern pragmatic goals or objectives, but signals the best 
way of going about attaining those goals, or avoiding paths that will not lead to the 
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satisfaction of those objectives. Hence, they are like epistemic actions in that they 
provide information that is not easily known or discovered , and by acting, preference 
intensities are signalled to other agents in interaction and third parties to the 
interaction. Emotional signalling, then, is aimed, epistemically, at being able to 
continue interaction, by avoiding games that may end the interaction . 
Ross and Dumouchel's (forthcoming) account can be equally applied to both short 
and long term interaction However given the emphasis of specific actions on the 
interlocutors present, I will be dealing primarily with short-term interactions. Thus 
while specific policies or objectives could potentially be interpreted in the final 
sections in an examination of real-time conversation (section 7.2 and 7.3), I will not 
be taking up this speculative account. Turning now to views of language in particular, 
I will be examining Andy Clark's (1997, 1998) account of the cognitive benefits of 
language. 
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6. Language and Artefacts 
So far we have taken two opposing views to cognition, the Classical Approach and the 
Activity-based Approach and explored ways in which actions can be used to solve 
cognitive problems externally in the micro-time domain, (i .e. faster than a fully 
representational system.) Along with external actions in the environment, I have tried to 
show how emotions can be used as epistemic actions to lighten cognitive load by 
constraining the search space and possible responses of subjects in interaction, in the 
service of higher level policies (concerned ultimately with pragmatic goals or 
objectives). What I propose to do now is to layout some of the views of language from 
cognitive science in order to try and show where dialogue, taken as an extension of 
activity, might be made to fit in: in particular, using insights gained from the activity 
driven approaches above to clarify some of the functions of dialogue. As a proponent of 
the activity driven approach, I will be examini ng And y Clark' s (1997, 1998) view of 
language as the ultimate artefact. 
6. 1 Language in Cognitive Science 
The standard view of language in Cognitive Science is in some shape or form strongly 
associated with internal representation . Following Chomsky (1965) and Fodor (1975, 
1987) language has been seen as a decontextualised string of code, composed of units 
with syntactic properties . Here language is identified with the 'abstraction amenable' 
(Spurrett and Cowley forthcoming : 1) elements of language23 . Language so 
understood leads to a view of internal representation that seems to exclude important 
features of language and interaction given the contextual constraints of embodied and 
situated agents. Further the stringent conditions imposed on language by the 
requirement of decontextualised units makes it difficult for them to be plausible 
options for an active approach to Cognitive Science. Against these standard views, 
language as an object of study has been identified with transcription of speech 
23 See Spurrett and Cowley (forthcoming) for a brief response to two major objections to dropping the 
'abstraction amenable ' approach to language: namely, the power of a sophisticated digital model and 
the view that language is arbitrary. In contrast, the emphasis is twned to utterance activity, a term of art 
used to refer 'to the full range of kinetic and prosodic features of the on-line behaviour of interacting 
humans.' (Spurrett and Cowiey, forthcoming: 1) 
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(Garrod and Pickering 2003, section 7.1) where the usual linguistic categories
24 
still 
apply. In contrast, Clark (1997, 1998) follows a more activity driven perspective, 
stressing the external nature of language. 
By now it should be clearer that cogilltive processing is not circumscribed either by 
language, or dependent on language in the form of representation (construed as a 
classical string of syntactically recombinable and context free units.) Brooks' various 
activity decomposed systems do not require any representations to operate robustly in 
particular task domains. One of the ways in which we can start to bring language into the 
picture is to treat language as an artefact, that, similar to pen and paper methods for 
performing long divisions, augments human cognition in various ways. 
Andy Clark in 'Magic Words: how language augments human computation' (1998) 
seeks to extend the idea of human cogilltion being augmented by the too Is and structures 
that we find in the environment. The idea is that like other things that we use to lighten 
computational load, it is a 'public ... tool ... a species of external artefact' (Clark 1997: 
162) that allows us to restructure computational space in order to solve problems. He is 
not denying that language is 'an instrument of interpersonal communication.' or that it 
plays a role in 'processes of information transfer' (Clark 1998: 162) but seeks to point 
out some of the other computational benefits that it may have. 
Clark's main claim is that language serves purposes other than communication. This 
view falls under the rubric of what he calls 'supra-communicative views of language' 
(1998: 163) What this posits is that language is more than a communication device for 
information transfer. These are not new claims and follow precedents set by Vygotosky 
(1986) and followed up in developmental studies by Diaz and Berk (1992) and also in 
philosophical work by Canuthers (1996). Clark's view is basically 'the idea of language 
as a computational transformer which allows pattern-completing brains to tackle 
otherwise intractable classes of cognitive problems' (1998: 163). Focussing on the 
external aspects of language, Clark argues for the computational benefits of language 
that are primarily external, rather than internalisations of text-like language. 
24 Garrod and ~ickering .(2003) use the following representational categories, phonetic, phonological, 
leXIcal, syntactIc, semantIc as parts of their model of dialogue. 
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6.2 Cognitive Benefits of Language 
Clark's vision is that language is largely the ' ultimate artefact' (1997), and because of 
this emphasis on externalisation, relies quite heavily on the idea of scaffolding. 
'Scaffolding denotes a broad class of physical, cognitive and social augmentations -
augmentations which allow us to achieve some goal which would otherwise be beyond 
us' (1998: 163) This is taken from research by Vygotsky (1986) and Berk and Garvin 
(1984) into the role of private speech in children. In observations and recordings of 
groups of children aged 5-10, Berk and Garvin 'found that most of the children's private · 
speech (speech not addressed to some other listener) seems keyed to the direction and 
control of the child's action. Subsequent study (Bivens and Berk 1990; Berk 1994) 
showed (a) that private speech increased amongst children trying to perfonn a difficult 
or complicated task whilst alone and (b) the higher the incidence of private speech or 
self-directed talk, the better the task was mastered. The emphasis here is that language is 
a tool for structuring and controlling action. The mind is not merely a manipulator but a 
controller. Language is not manipulated by the brain but used by the brain to control 
actions. Language is not merely a vehicle or medium of infonnation transfer. This leads 
to the intra-individual view of language not as a representation or expression, but as a 
tool for effecting change in one's environment. What then is special about natural 
language is that it has an effect on an individual precisely because it is not in a hidden or 
more fundamental code. In line with scaffolding language can be seen as a sort of control 
loop or action loop which, amongst other things, reminds us what to do, controls what 
we are doing and provides a bench-mark against which to measure perfonnance. 
This leads to two related but distinct views. Carruthers sees language as a special kind of 
thought. Dennett offers a second version which depicts ' linguiform inputs as having 
distinctive effects on some inner computational device'. Thus one view is that language 
enables a sort 'public thinking'. This is not however tied to a particular language, and the 
brain is not being re-programmed, but that certain types of thinking are undertaken in 
public language and thereby enabled. Dennett's view is put by Clark to be a suggestion 
that ' conscious human minds are more or less serial virtual machines implemented-
inefficiently- on the parallel hardware that evolution provided for us' (Clark 1998: 166, 
Dennett 1991: 278) The difference here between Clark and Dennett is that Dennett 
seems to see language as the 'literal installation of a new kind of computational device 
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inside the brain." While it is not clear to what extent Dennett and Clark disagree, Clark 
(at least) sees language as primarily external and a complement to representation and 
computation. Clark contends that language 'use(s) the same old (essentially pattern 
completing) resources to model the special kinds of behaviour observed in the public 
linguistic world.' (1998: 168) 
Clark looks at language as a transformer. Thus, it is part of material culture caught up in 
_ but not constituting - cognitive looping. Given his concern with challenging cognitive 
internalism, it seems natural to highlight the artefactual nature of much language. 
However, while endorsing this part of his thinking, I wish to shift the emphasis away 
from so-called higher cognitive processes. For Clark (1997: 202; 1998: 169-173), the 
following are the important resources made possible by language. 
• Memory augmentation (use of diaries, libraries etc.) 
• Environmental simplification (e.g. use of road signs) 
• Co-ordination and reduction of on-line deliberation (use of language In Goint) 
planning) 
• Taming of path dependent learning (language allows prevIous learning to cross 
between agents and bear on 'unrelated' future events) 
• Attention and resource allocation (given these resources, what do we prioritise?) 
• Data manipulation and representation (especially in working with text) 
Given the 'reasoning bias' (higher cognitive function) of the list, it is not surprising that, 
like Vygotsky (1986), Clark emphasises the self-directed speech that allows 
vocalizations to re-organize cognitive space. The re-organization of cognitive space 
allows children and adults to better direct and plan subsequent actions, allowing them to 
accomplish cognitive tasks that would otherwise be too difficult or time-consuming. 
Written and spoken language is used, at least in these cases, to augment the natural 
capacities of the brain, primarily by being manipulated externally. 
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6.3 Applications to Language in Dialogue 
We started out by looking at some of the benefits which can accrue to cognitive systems 
that actively used the constraints of embodiment and situatedness to solve cognitive 
problems. These systems do not need internal representational or central control 
capacities as understood by a Classical Approach. Expanding on an active approach to 
cognition, an examination of human player's strategies for Tetris reveal a function of 
action, epistemic action, aimed at, through the deployment of action, discovering 
information that is either difficult to uncover or compute and thereby aimed not at an 
immediate pragmatic goal (completing the task) but changing the cognitive state of the 
agent. It should be clear by now that language in its symbolic form can have cognitive 
benefits other than information transfer in the service of pragmatic goals. However even 
in these views, we have been looking at language in ways that assume the appearance of 
word like forms, and is for the most part dependent on the manipulation of actual text 
and signs. What we need to begin to do is look at ways in which words can be used in an 
on-line immediate fashion, looking for evidence of what could be called epistemic and 
strategic action that happens not as manipulation of text or speech in the pursuit of a 
task, or the solving of a problem, but as interaction between people and the sounds that 
they make. For the Classical Approach excludes the kinds of emotional effects that 
language use can have in interaction and Clark's brand of external ism, whilst acceptable, 
does not address the effects that the speaking of words may have for ourselves as well as 
other agents in interaction For in on-line behaviour it is probable, that rather than relying 
on the appearance of the abstraction amenable elements of language, word-like forms 
and syntax, spoken language may have functions other than information transfer, namely 
the discovery of sufficient information about the relation of the agent to either a task, 
(assuming indeterminate and dynamic results of actions) or, more importantly, other 
agents in order to pursue further tasks as well as continue (or have the possibility of 
continuing) the interaction in which an agent is currently involved. 
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7. Distributed Cognition in Dialogue 
Now that we have looked at some of the ways emotions can aid agents in approaching 
situations where the potential interaction space is not bounded, nor information 
complete, we will begin to try and apply some of these comments to dialogue as a 
case in which both action, context or situation and words are all central to the function 
of the event. I will examine Pickering and Garrod's (2003) mechanistic view of 
dialogue, which contends that the alignment (according to representational categories) 
in dialogue is automatic. Then, focussing on the phenomena of acoustics and actions 
in speech, I will try to show that sounds, apart from words, can have strategic and 
cognitive effects on agents in interaction. Alignment then does not depend on 
common ground based on representation, but on current and shared histories of joint 
activity. In contrast I will look at some ofCowley's data (1998) to show that what is 
important in dialogue and responded to by the persons involved, is not alignment of 
representations, but strategic and epistemic actions aimed at alignment and 
coordination amongst interlocutors. 
7.1 A Mechanistic Psychology of Dialogue 
As in the example of Kismet, social interactions can be regulated by cognitive looping 
and scaffolding that has no need of representations of abstraction amenable elements 
oflanguage. Using architecture inspired by Rodney Brooks, Breazeal has been able to 
build a robot that is able to loop flexibly with people ih interaction without direct 
planning. The actions and (emotions) that the robot exhibits are used to influence the 
subject in the interaction into fulfilling the current state (drives) of the robot. This 
provides some argument for more basic and autonomous mechanisms underlying 
human speech. Pickering and Garrod (2003) provide evidence and argument for 
alignment at the level of linguistic representation. 
The following transcript is taken from a conversation between two players in a co-
operative maze game (Garrod and Anderson, 1987). 
'In this extract one player A is trying to describe his position to his partner B who is 
viewing the same maze on a computer screen in another room. 
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Example dialogue taken from Garrod and Anderson (1987) 
1. B: ... Tell me where you are? 
2. A: Ehm : Oh God (laughs) 
3. B: (laughs) 
4. A: Right: two along from the bottom one up: 
5. B: Two along from the bottom, which side? 
6. A: The left: going from left to right in the second box. 
7. B: You're in the second box. 
8. A: One up :(1 sec.) I take it we've got identical mazes? 
9. B: yeah well: right, starting from the left, you're one along: 
10. A: Uh-huh: 
11. B: and one up? 
12. A: Yeah and I'm trying to get to ..... 
[28 utterances later] 
41. B: You are starting from the left, you're one along, one up? (2 sec.) 
42. A: Two along: I'm not in the first box, I'm in the second box: 
43. B: You're two along: 
44. A: Two up (1 sec.) counting the: if you take: the first box as being one up : 
45. B: (2 sec.) Uh-huh : 
46. A: Well: I'm two along two up: (1.5 sec.) 
47. B: Two up? : 
48. A: Yeah (1 sec.) so I can move down one: 
49: B: Yeah I see where you are: (pickering and Garrod 2003:4) 
Now it looks like there are very few grammatically well-formed sentences. This is 
taken as important evidence against an undue focus on complete and grammatical 
sentences that grows out of theories associated with Chomsky (1965) and Fodor 
(1975). Further there are differences between one speakers description of the same 
position (A: (4) "two along from the bottom one up" is quite different from (46) "two 
along, two up"). Garrod and Pickering point out that it can be seen as quite orderly if 
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'we assume that dialogue is a joint activity (Clark, H. 1996).' that 'involves 
cooperation between interlocutors in a way that allows them to sufficiently understand 
the meaning of the dialogue as a whole: and this meaning results from joint 
processes.' (2003: 5). 
Part of the importance of looking at dialogue is that turn-taJUng is not hard and fast 
and further that many utterances can only make sense across a number of 'turns'. e.g. 
statements like (4) "Right, two along from the bottom two up" 'requires an 
affirmation or a query'. (2003: 5) The point is that a co-ordinated activity such as 
conversation cannot be broken down into neat turns. For the purposes of their paper, 
Pickering and Garrod define coordination as joint activity (like dancing or boxing) 
and alignment as when interlocutors share the same representation at a particular 
level. '[ AJlignment occurs at a particular level when interlocutors have the same 
representation at that level. Dialogue is a coordinated behaviour Gust like ballroom 
dancing). However, the linguistic representations that underlie coordinated dialogue 
come to be aligned.' (2003: 6) 
Now it is posited that 'alignment of situation models is central to successful dialogue.' 
where a situation model is 'multi-dimensional representation of the situation under 
discussion.' (2003: 6) including space, time, causality, intentionality and reference to 
main individuals under discussion. Now it might be that the interlocutors represent 
situation models differently, but it is assumed that it is inefficient to maintain two 
models at once. Further if the situation models are in fact aligned, then it is 
unnecessary to model the representations of the interlocutor. In higher level 
arguments, of course the interlocutors need not align totally. They do however have to 
still align in terms of reference to particular parties or entities, whereas they may 
disagree about the value of these particular entities or parties. 
Given that explicit achievement of alignment (e.g. agreeing on definitions) is unusual 
Pickering & Garrod propose that "'global" alignment of models seems to result from 
"local" alignment at the level of the linguistic representations being used.' (2003: 7) 
In achieving alignment of situation models, Pickering and Garrod 'propose that this 
works via a priming mechanism, whereby encountering an utterance that uses that 
representation makes it more likely that the person will subsequently produce an 
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utterance that uses that representation' (2003: 7). The processes involved are then 
much more automatic and multi-modal and less explicit than we would assume for a 
task that appears to be quite cognitively demanding. Neither are they 
representationally demanding in terms of a situation model, but rather rely on basic 
coordination of speech. 
For instance in the dialogue presented at the beginning of this section, A and B 
assume slightly different interpretations of 'two along'. A is interpreting two along by 
counting the boxes in the maze, whereas B is interpreting 'two along' as the 
connections between the boxes. Thus in relation to A, 'two along' actually means 
'three along'. The misalignment is recognised due to the fact that 'two along' does not 
easily fit into a current representation. The way in which it is repaired is to iterate or 
reformulate the utterance. For instance in (7) the formulation is simply repeated with a 
rising intonation, or a simple clarificatory request is made, as in (5) B 'Two along 
from the bottom, which side?' . Sometimes more radical reformulations are necessary 
as when 'Two along' is reformulated as 'second box ' (6) These requests, sometimes 
in the form of requests and iterations, sometimes in direct reformulations 'reflect 
failures to understand what the speaker is saying in relation to the listener's model' 
(2003 : 9) The clarificatory moves are an attempt to make the interlocutor find a 
linguistic representation that is more suitable to the listener's model. For example B 
says 'you're one along, one up' (41) which B immediately reformulates as 'Two 
along' (42) This returns a clarification request of 'You're two along' until by 
utterance (44) the representations come to be aligned, evidenced by the fact that the 
interlocutors can now complete each others utterances. 
The use of a transcript leads Garrod and Pickering to a heavy reliance on some notion 
of representational categories. To their credit though, they do not assume the decoding 
and encoding of representations through words like forms. Rather the representations 
are legible between parties without the necessity of encoding, and as such are not in a 
hidden or more fundamental code. The interesting case and argument that they make 
is that these alignments are more or less automatic. If these sorts of alignments are 
automatic, then they begin to look like the skills that we have in such pragmatically 
motivated domains as typing. 
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Now while it is granted that this particular experimental set-up is required for control 
purposes and is able to display some of the interesting alignments that happen in 
dialogue, this set-up is evidently not usual in most conversation
25 
The experimental 
subjects are excluded from a social situation and have been provided with a cognitive 
task that has definite criteria for what count as success or failure, (the ability to 
navigate jointly around a maze from different perspectives.) In contrast, most 
conversation is undertaken in face-to-face situations that for the most part involve 
social aspects of interaction. Thus, while the experimental set-up produces the 
reported results, it also excludes the possibility of social interaction where less 
definite goals may give rise to more strategic and epistemic interaction. 
I propose now to look at a natural conversation where the situation is given, (in virtue 
of the fact that interlocutors are in the same place) . Then we can assume that all these 
automatic processes are in operation. This has two consequences. First if the situation 
is given then the relation to the situation becomes more important (and that includes 
to people in the same situation). Secondly, differences in tone and prosodics, 
associated with the emotions that they convey, held against a situation that is the same 
for all interlocutors, tend to be more prominent. 
7.2 Pieces of Italian Dialogue 
I now turn to an example of dialogue that has what I consider to be several 
paradigmatic aspects. First the parties to the conversation are all present. Secondly it 
occurs in a domestic setting. Thirdly it is more interesting for our purposes since it 
involves what Cowley has called 'a bit of nagging,26 This means that the parties are 
well known to each other. What I propose to do is show the ways in which utterances 
can have emotional effects and how these emotional effects can be shown in phonetic 
transcripts of the conversation. The phonetic transcripts will, I argue, provide 
evidence of the ways in which people manage the relationships around them?7 In so 
25 Garrod and Pickering do not deny more complex functions of conversation, e.g. the provocation of 
emotion, but maintain that these alignment mechanisms are primitive and underlie conversation more 
generally. 
26 Personal Communication 
27 To avoid any process view, the synchronic perspective is dropped for a focus on particular events. 
Drawing on various traditions, Cowley (1998) looks at talk with respect to voice dynamics (see 
Abercrombie, 1967) and temporally embedded context (see, Kendon, 1990). ' 
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doing we see ho"w in utterance activity, two or more brains contextualise activity that 
results not in internalised representations but public coordination. Drawing on epistemic 
actions, I will try to show that aspects of talk - both word-based and phonetic - are 
dedicated to the perception and discovery of information that, now, is relevant to the 
agent. 
Let us consider events from an family conversation taking place in Italy (for fuller 
description, see Cowley 1993; 1998). The participants involved are the mother, Rosa, the 
father, Aldo, and an adult daughter, Monica. While eating an evening meal, talk turns to 
why a husband, Aldo (A) failed to cut ills wife, Rosa (R), the pea-poles she wanted (it is 
several months into pea season), or, paraphrasing, that ' a certain person is too lazy to cut 
pea-poles'. In raising this, Rosa (R) is heard as complaining - in her husband ' s hearing -
to their daughter Monica (M). Strategically, she is hoping to gain her daughter ' s 
sympathy by complaining of her husbands inadequacies. As it happens it soon comes to 
light that Aldo has in fact cut the pea-poles that she had requested. Not surprisingly, tills 
comes nowhere near satisfying Rosa. Quite the contrary. Rather, while acknowledging 
her mistake, she changes tack: 
English version Italian original 
(10) R : Too right, they were you should have R: Affatti se vedessi le bacchette ah son piu' 
seen the poles oh they're longer than this lunghe di questa camera se non piu' . 
room if not longer. 
(11) A: Come o::n 
(12) M: Come o::n 
(13) R: (if) not longer 
(14) M: No 
A: Oeu 
M: Oeu 
R: Non piu ' 
M:Va 
(Cowley 1998:548) 
Rosa attempts once more to gain her daughters' sympathy by complaining that the poles, 
even though they had been cut, are far too long, and thus unsatisfactory. She is 
effectively saying that the poles are longer than the four metre room. Now replying to 
the assertion that the pea-poles were as long as the four metre room, would be missing 
the strategic significance of the utterance. Further, aligning according to linguistic 
categories will not solve a problem, for this is not what is at stake. Rather, words' failing 
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Aldo the utterance evokes what Goffman (1981) calls a 'response cry'. The sound made , 
is 'amenable to being glossed as "come on, you must be joking", and in the context is 
clearly legible as an action of gentle mocking' (Spurrett and Cowley forthcoming: 13). 
What is transcribed as 'oeu' (and translated as 'come o::n') represents a non-standard 
sound that cannot be reduced to words, but is a 'vocal gesture .. the duration of which 
can be stretched to that of a short sentence.' (Spurrett and Cowley forthcoming: 14) As 
Spurrett and Cowley (forthcoming) comment, 'What is most striking, though, is not the 
internal prosodic properties of Aldo' s "Oeu" but its relational properties in the context of 
the interaction, and the shared history of the three people present' (Spurrett and Cowley 
forthcoming: 14). 
The talk exemplifies a social payoff that arises in managing family members. On this 
occasion, Rosa gets what husband and daughter regard as her due reward: they ridicule 
her. In so doing, they find that they share each other's attitudes and feel they belong. 
They get satisfaction from being 'on the same wavelength'. None of this, however, arises 
in what is said: rather, it depends on vocal (and visible) expression lacking any syntactic 
or semantic basis. Or that saying 'oeu' is a practice which, among other things, enables 
one to label something (or someone) as absurd. Even if no such word appears in 
dictionaries, the activity is constrained by, at times, saying 'oeu' while looking and 
gesturing in specific (Italian) ways. Cognitive action spreads across the environment 
even if, necessarily, it loops between individuals. 
Rosa's initial utterances are strategic, aimed at getting Monica to coordinate emotionally 
with her, and against her husband. When the initial utterance fails to gain the desired 
effect, her next utterance tries again, on a different tack, to produce the desired effect. 
Importantly, what is being said (the words used) are not critical to the possible strategic 
effects of the action, and unlike Tetris, do not have determinate results to possible 
actions. Rather Rosa's utterances are epistemic action loops, that include other persons, 
motivated by a need for information (is Monica with Rosa against Aldo?) that will also 
serve to change cognitive states, Monica's and in turn Rosa's, by producing 
coordination. Her utterances, as strategic actions, create expectations amongst other 
persons, which as we see, may be disappointed. The lack of determinate response, as 
evidenced by Aldo and Monica's response to Rosa's second attempt, demands greater 
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flexibility from the agents involved in tracking the different vocal gestures and the 
emotional signals that they contain. 
The moves in this family game reveal several aspects of epistemic action. Rosa saying 
that her husband cut four metre pea-poles is designed neither as part of a story nor as a 
factual claim. Rather, it is action designed to probe attitudes and create expectations. 
Without a detennined response to an action, the goal of the utterance is, through 
epistemic action, emotional coordination amongst agents (and against others). Aldo 
instead of hearing what Rosa wants, rightly responds with what is transcribed as "oeu". 
Although stating nothing, saying 'oeu' alters each person's state of mind. Apart from 
anything else, as shown below, it prods the daughter into subtle response. Before 
examining microcognition in real-time, we can visibly see from the transcript (and 
following phonetic record) that talk can be irreducible to successive speech acts. Often 
what happens is simultaneously strategic, epistemic and perceptual action that primes 
and provokes further goings on. 
7.3 Microcognitive Details of Conversation 
Turning to how these abstract descriptions play out in microtemporal detail, we fmd, as 
in Tetris, that events depend on how the actions are modulated, attempting to show how 
'three voices reaffirm family relationships' (Cowley 1998 549) The temporal details 
are as follows: when Rosa prods her husband with the first utterance of 'non piu' (10) 
she speaks so that her voice falls to 220 Hz and, as it turns out, this influences his 
responding. 
In the following, her 'non piu" is represented iconically and measures are given for its 




28 All measures were made on a Kay sonagram. For details, see Cowley (1998). 
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The message and the dynamic features of her speaking prod Aldo into his response cry. 
Beginning between the 'non' and the 'piu", instead of using his usual (male) pitch 
range, beginning at 180 Hz he raises his voice into a female domain, ending his 'Oeu' at 
the same frequency as Rosa's last utterance, 220 Hz (duration is about 760 msec.): 
220 
180 ".-
0:::: e:::::::: u::::: 
Given that Aldo starts speaking during the 'p' of , piu' " the alignment cannot be planned. 
Rather, the overlap shows that some kind of perception-action mechanism29 allows him 
to orient to the pitch of Rosa's voice. In producing 'oeu' his voice matches her final 
pitch level (to within about 4 Hz) and flattens out (220 Hz). In short, he latches on to or 
echoes the final note of his wife's utterance. Nor is this likely to be coincidence. Rather, 
it is likely that it is nonpragmatic action The best evidence for this is found in his 
daughter's response. Approximately 300 milliseconds after he starts speaking, she not 
only comes in with a similar 'oeu' but, as the acoustic record shows, orients to the same 
target. 
29 The harmonisations present in this example are coordinated both according to the vocal production 
?f the utt.erer as well as. that of the other. This example of affective coordination, like strategic actions, 
mvolve llltegratlOn of mputs from each participants's own behaviour and that of others.' (Spurrett and 
Cowley, forthcoming: 15-16) 
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The voices are shown below, 
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(Spurrett and Cowley forthcoming. 14) 
Beginning at 227 Hz, Monica's voice matches Aldo's 0,16 seconds after she begins 
her 'Oeu'. Their voices, not merely converging, harmonise for a further +- 0.25 
seconds, remaining on the same note as Rosa's last utterance. Finally, Aldo running 
out of breath allows the pitch of his voice to fall, whi le Monica continues for a further 
0.2 seconds, at which poi nt she' signalled her enj oyment with a laugh pitched to the 
top of her father's range' (Cowley 1998: 551) 
From one perspective, this is AIdo and Monica 'ridiculing' Rosa good naturedly and in 
harmony. Saying 'oeu' as described, in these circumstances, is just that. 'At this 
moment, this is helped both by smiles heard in the concurrent oeus (smiles that are 
also seen) and, as is highly audible, in the harmony and simultaneity of the voices.' 
(Cowley 1998:549) They ridicule Rosa thanks to how they, so to speak, align their 
voices meaningfully in contrast to hers. The alignment produced is not representationally 
based, but understood immediately by all parties present, producing coordination in 
public space, The 'good nature' is physically-based harmony as well as Moruca's little 
(father directed?) laugh. Far from relying on planning, this is spontaneous, public 
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activity spilling across persons. Such cases serve to make three points. First, the 200ms 
duration of Aldo and Monica's harmonisation allows the alignment or attunement to 
reach consciousness: given Monica's laugh, it seems likely that this occurs. Second, 
what happens is too fast and too responsive for central planning. Evidence of this occurs 
as Aldo's 'oeu' begins between Rosa's 'non' and 'piu". Third, while the example is 
useful because it occurs on 'oeu', similar effects often exploit the words actually spoken. 
In utterance-activity, there are times when words are mere background to relationships 
that rely on the meshing of vocal and other expression and these meshings alleviate the 
burden for a full representational account either cognitively or linguistically. 
The actions and attunements present here show episternic and strategic qualities. Rosa's 
assertion is aimed both at producing and discovering whether Monica is in accord with 
her estimation of her husband's inadequacies as well as prodding Aldo into some kind of 
response. However, she is disappointed as AJdo's response 'indexing [Rosa's] utterance' 
(Spurrett and Cowley forthcoming: 14) and Monica's harmonisation and the laugh that 
indexes his normal range shows. "Aldo and Monica are identifiably 'together' because 
their utterances harmonise, showing a brief allegiance in the same way as bodily 
orientation shows acceptance or rejection." (Spurret and Cowley, forthcoming: 14) Nor 
was this short event without effect, for Rosa, rather than hearing the good humour, 
shortly avowed, that the next time she was in the vi lIage, she would get a friend to 
confirm the length of the poles. (Cowley 1998: 566) 
The sense of the conversation is not contained in the formal or abstraction amenable 
features of language or conversation, but in the physical quality of how what is said is 
vocalised. The absence of the acoustic record would not be able to expose the subtle 
moves of a family game as they do here. The sense of this piece of conversation exploits 
how we co-ordinate practices through alignment that rely on bio-mechanical constraints. 
In talk, how we go on is often irreducible to word-based patterns and is better understood 
in terms of epistemic action and coordinated activity. 
7.4 General Implications 
The lessons we learn from this example of pitch matching are two fold. First, meaningful 
content is ascribed to parts of speech, particular sounds and harmonisations which of , 
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necessity happen between people. These typically are actions in very short time domains, 
that exploiting either response cries or actual words, are public and external. The fact 
that they happen between people and are not even discernibly word-based (as in this, 
perhaps extreme, example) is enough, to show that it is unlikely that speech production 
and language is concerned only with the generation of abstraction amenable elements of 
lan!!Uaae as a representational account would have it. For here there is no, and cannot 
o 0' 
be, the kind of formal aspects of language that a representational account of cognition 
demands. Secondly these are not pragmatic actions, but emotional and epistemic ones. 
This is in part because, given the short response time, they cannot be explicitly planned .. 
Further they cannot be planned to produce a pragmatic effect, aimed as they are at 
eliciting information from persons about the relationships concerned. We use these 
features of utterances to impart information and pick up on information that creates 
expectations amongst parties that guide and coordinate subsequent interaction. The 
phenomenon of pitch matching is part both of the circumstances and the relations of the 
parties involved and as such is massively distributed. In order to elicit meaning, language 
can at times lean heavily on a coordination of events in the micro-temporal domain 
superposed on an environment of both interpersonal relationships and cultural norms. 
Far from being an isolated incident, 'Similar forms of indexing can be found by looking 
beyond pitch, and attending to the ways in which, inter alia, accent, timing and loudness 
play out in utterance activity' (Spurrett and Cowley, forthcoming: 15). Further these 
features of utterance activities are all but ubiquitous at all ages (Spurrett and Cowley, 
forthcoming: 15). However the effects of these kinds of phenomena are not always as 
striking as the example presented here, as they depend on a shared history of joint 
activity. The physical manipulations of voices are based on the ability to perceive the 
tones of the person with whom one is conversing. This episode is, however, 'evidence of 
the ways in which prosodic patterns between people with histories of shared intimacy are 
modulated by that history, as they can be by cultural experiences' (Spurrett and Cowley, 
forthcoming: 14). Prosodic actions in speech operate as epistemic actions when legible 
by other parties with the aim, not of achieving immediate pragmatic ends, but 
coordination that is characteristic of relationships. 
62 
8. Conclusion . 
In this paper I have argued, that from the perspective of Cognitive Science, activity 
driven approaches are better at real-world problem solving because their architectures 
do not demand categorisation based on representation. Active systems are able to 
exploit the dynamics of real-world environments, allowing them to directly influence 
the achievement of their goals. In the process, problem-solving becomes less abstract 
and turns toward complete working systems accomplishing tasks in the real world 
with no reliance on either specific coding of environments or computationally 
extensive (and expensive) algorithms. Following a reliance on action to solve 
problems, there is a category of action, epistemic action, whose primary function is 
not to achieve pragmatic goals based on plans generated from complete 
representations, but, through continuous recourse to the world, through action, to 
change the cognitive state of the agent in pursuit of those goals. This ability alleviates 
the need for complete representation, thus being computationally less expensive, 
enabling the system to achieve a much faster response time. This demands a cognitive 
model that features recourse to the world through action at any stage of problem-
solving. In addition, these actions are deployed more, not less, by skilled agents, 
under the guidance of higher level and longer tenn goals, providing evidence of 
higher level cognitive controL 
In turning to how epistemic action may feature in human interaction amongst agents, 
it is shown that, in the absence of complete abstract and representational information, 
agents use emotional cues to prompt a desired response, placing expectations on their 
interlocutors . In addition to constraining the interaction amongst agents, emotional 
cues are used to signal preference intensity amongst possible outcomes, enabling the 
continuation of subsequent interaction. In examining a piece of natural dialogue, we 
find the sorts of alignments of attitude aimed at coordination that allow the 
continuation of interaction, quite apart from more or less arbitrary, (from the 
perspective of activity) formal representations . Moreover, in the example examined, 
no possible representational account can be given, for the utterances show no formal 
representational qualities, and in the most useful case for my purposes, do not exploit 
recognisable words. In this example dialogue is supported and sustained not by the 
presence of symbols, or of grammatical or linguistic representations, but by the 
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actions of the parties concerned, in epistemically and strategically attempting to align 
and coordinate externally through physical vocalisations and gestures in public space; 
thus, dialogue, while making use of what might be called symbols, is actively 
supported by mechanisms and strategies other than possible process formalisations. 
I have tried to show how cognitive systems might be able to proceed in the face of a 
more or less constant lack of abstraction amenable information by paying attention to 
epistemic actions that occur in the microsecond domain. Far from resulting In 
degenerate forms of language use, this tends to be more efficient. Language In 
conversation is not primarily a form of scaffolding or artefact manipulation. The goals 
of conversation may include simultaneously the epistemic goal of alignment, (the 
eliciting of information that I do not have) and strategic goals (creating expectation 
and producing coordination). Epistemic and strategic actions include the ways In 
which we manage relationships. Conversation remains the most basic case of 
interpersonal interaction and language use and begins to show some of the ways in 
which language in terms of its formal properties can be meshed with vIews 
emphasising the activity of language and the activity surrounding language. 
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